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ABSTRACT
Managing Pharmaceutical Research and Development Portfolios: An Empirical Inquiry into
Managerial Decision Making in the Context of a Merger
By
Catrina Marie Jones
May 2016

Committee Chair:

Danny Bellenger

Major Academic Unit:

Executive Doctorate in Business

Most research and development portfolio managers face one common problem: They are
expected to select projects for a portfolio that will yield high returns and a viable pipeline for future
growth. The onset of a merger or acquisition adds complexity to existing portfolio management
challenges. Prior research has shown that most research and development projects fail or terminate
after a merger or acquisition, especially within the pharmaceutical industry. This research takes a
case study approach to examine how managers make decisions during the portfolio management
process. We apply a narrative-based decision theory to explain what influences their decisions.
The major findings that emerged are: (1) post-merger processes and methods are applied with
greater rigor and lack integration, (2) managers’ perspectives on how they make decisions differ
from reality, and (3) managers inject personal criterion into standardized portfolio evaluations. We
contribute to the literature on portfolio management by providing insight into merger influences
on managerial decision making. The implications of R&D post-merger portfolio shrinkage are
discussed.
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I
I.1

INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement
Firms that engage in research and development (R&D) face a critical task of selecting

portfolios that will contribute to both its short and long-term profitability. The process for
selecting a portfolio has proven to be challenging due to manager’s inability to predict portfolio
outcomes. These challenges are further extended when the complexity of a merger is integrated
into the portfolio management (PfM) process. Prior research reveals that mergers require the
integration of key functions of a firm, especially the R&D functional area. Within the
pharmaceutical (pharma) industry, the results of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have shown
significant declines in R&D, demonstrating the potential need for more effective post-merger
PfM processes. One of the key components of pharma PfM is portfolio selection. Although
pharma portfolio selections are often driven by financial analyses, there is also a requirement for
managers to make decisions based upon the output of these financial valuations and other criteria
identified by the firm. Prior research on pharma PfM processes suggests that managers’
portfolio decision-making behaviors are often altered based on the strategies set forth by the
executive team. For example, a study conducted by Smith and Sonnenblick (2013) revealed that
because executives had difficulty terminating projects so that more viable projects could be
added to the portfolio, managers followed suit and went against their recommendations year after
year by allowing projects that should be terminated to remain the R&D portfolio. The
motivation behind managers’ decisions needs to be further explored within pharma, especially
after M&A, so that firms can become aware of executive influences on managers’ portfolio
decisions and seek out ways to eliminate these distractions. After a pharma merger, portfolio
selections become even more critical since wrong decisions can be detrimental to a firm.
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According to the Wall Street Journal, there were over 112 deals announced in 2015,
making it the biggest M&A Year of all time (“2015 Becomes the Biggest M&A Year Ever,
2016). More than $200 billion was at play in the last round of M&A activity within the pharma
industry – a frenzy that includes 14 deals announced in 2014 ("'Trying to Recapture the Magic’:
The Strategy Behind the Pharma M&A Rush," 2014). PharmaZeta acquired Warner-Lambert in
2000 for $90 billion. As a result of this merger, PharmaZeta found itself saddled with some
businesses it didn’t want ("'Trying to Recapture the Magic’: The Strategy Behind the Pharma
M&A Rush," 2014). Japan’s Daiichi Sankyo in 2008 bought a 64% stake in Ranbaxy for $4.2
billion, but problems followed soon thereafter, with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
banning the U.S. distribution of drugs produced in Ranbaxy facilities in India after discovering
lapses in regulatory compliance ("'Trying to Recapture the Magic’: The Strategy Behind the
Pharma M&A Rush," 2014). Pharma firms spend billions yearly engaging in M&A seeking to
develop and grow R&D portfolios. Table 1 displays the Top 25 M&A deals in 2013. These
deals included acquisitions of small to large-sized pharma firms.
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Table 1 Top 25 M&A Deals in the Year 2013
Acquired Firm
Acquiring Firm
Thermo Fisher
Life Technologies
Scientific
Amgen
Onyx Pharmaceuticals
Valeant
Bausch + Lomb
Pharmaceuticals
International
Perrigo
Elan
Actavis
Warner Chilcott
AstraZeneca
Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS;
Diabetes development operations)

Shire
BayerHealthCare
Patheon
Salix Pharmaceuticals
Mylan
Grifols
Madison Dearborn
Partners
Endo Health Solutions
KKR
AstraZeneca
GlaxoSmithKline

Jazz Pharmaceuticals
Johnson & Johnson
Allergan
Otsuka Pharmaceutical
Cubist Pharmaceuticals
Novo A/S
Akorn Pharmaceuticals
Pharmstandard

ViroPharma
Algeta
NewCo
Santarus
Agila (injectables business of
Strides Arcolab Ltd.)
PharmaIota (blood transfusion
diagnostics unit)
Ikaria
Paladin Labs
PRA International
Pearl Therapeutics
GlaxoSmithKline
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (India
pharmaceuticals subsidiary)
Gentium
Aragon Pharmaceuticals
MAP Pharmaceuticals
Astex Pharmaceuticals
Trius Therapeutics
Xellia Pharmaceuticals
Hi-Tech Pharmacal
Beaver Pharmaceutical Pte Ltd.

Price
$13.6 billion
$10.4 billion
$8.7 billion

About $8.6 billion
About $8.5 billion
Up to $4.3 billion – including
$2.7 billion upfront, up to $1.4
billion tied to regulatory and
sales-based milestones, and up to
$225 million to transfer of assets.
AstraZeneca also agreed to pay
BMS royalties on set sales
through 2025
About $4.2 billion
$2.9 billion
More than $2.6 billion
$2.6 billion
Up to $1.75 billion
$1.657 billion
About $1.6 billion
About $1.6 billion
More than $1.3 billion
$1.15 billion
$1.028 billion (Rs. 54 billion)

About $1 billion
Up to $1 billion
$958 million
$886 million
$704 million
$700 million
$640 million
$590 million

Data obtained from GEN Insight and Intelligence website (2015)
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Table 2 shows three major mergers and its post-merger portfolio outcomes. The strategic motives
of all three mergers involved R&D savings. However, the outcomes were decreased
expenditures due to budget constraints and pipeline deterioration. Merged pharma firms tend to
focus on short-term projects that can be developed cheaper and faster with favorable profits. As
a result, pipelines of some of the largest pharma firms have shown significant declines. Merged
pharma firms need to find the balance between staying risk averse and satisfying short-term sales
targets without sacrificing future growth (Smith & Sonnenblick, 2013).
Although merged pharma firms have applied reputable valuation methods to aid in the
selection of an optimum portfolio, R&D declines suggest that better decisions are needed, and
more effective portfolio processes could be adopted. These declines could partially be attributed
to the behaviors of managers responsible for making portfolio decisions. To achieve growth,
firms need to understand why pharma R&D portfolios are less successful after a merger.
Gaining insight into what managers are actually doing throughout the PfM process could provide
possible answers for the decline of R&D success.
To appropriately manage a firm’s portfolio, decisions must be made on when to fund
projects so that long-term growth can be established (Kester, Griffin, Hultink, & Lauche, 2011).
Making the wrong portfolio decisions can be devastating to a firm’s budget, and new PfM
strategies may need to be developed. Deciding on the right portfolio can mean the difference
between remaining competitive and falling behind (Martinsuo, 2013). Within the automotive
industry, executive leader Bill Ford acknowledged in 2006 that it was management’s failure to
make the right portfolio decisions that led Ford Motor into financial trouble (Kester et al., 2011).
Forced to refocus their efforts in the midst of the economic recession, Ford, General
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Table 2 Portfolio Outcomes of 3 Major Pharmaceutical Mergers
Merger
Acquired Acquiring
Strategic Motive
Outcome
Year
Firm
Firm
1995
Wellcome Glaxo
Challenges of a
*Glaxo Wellcome
changing industry

experienced short-term

environment patent

savings but no long-term

expirations

growth; Firm struggled to find
replacements for its
blockbuster drugs whose
patents expired in the US

2008

Wyeth

PharmaZeta

Streamline R&D

**PharmaZeta’s R&D multi-

capabilities

billion dollar cost savings
resulted from elimination of
research sites, programs, and
scientists

2014

Allergan

Actavis

Billion dollars

**Actavis cut R&D

R&D cost savings

expenditures

Source: *Mega Pharma Book, **Pharmaceutical-technology.com

Motors, and Chrysler (known as the Big Three) all announced a complete change in product
strategy at the beginning of 2009 (Kester et al., 2011). The Big Three begin focusing on
building portfolios of more fuel-efficient cars, following the lead of their top competitor, Toyota
(Kester et al., 2011). Portfolios need to be continuously reviewed and adjusted based on
valuation outcomes and other portfolio criteria in order to remain competitive.
To aid in R&D portfolio decision making, firms rely on ranking, economic decision
theory (single and multi-stage), portfolio optimization, cognitive modeling, and ad-hoc decision
methods. Although the literature focuses primarily on the use of these valuation methods, none
of the methods explain the behaviors that drive the PfM decisions. Additionally, these methods
are often applied to a once-a-year decision event rather than an ongoing process (Martino, 1995).
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As a result, many firms face reduced success due to their inability to make effective portfolio
decisions (Kester et al., 2011).
Mestre-Ferrandiz, Sussex, and Towse (as cited by Smith and Sonneblick, 2013) reported
that pharma projects are extremely high risk (fewer than 10 percent make it to market),
expensive (a single project can cost hundreds of millions of dollars), and have long time frames
(typically 3-8 years). Given these statistics, managers may feel that always making the right
portfolio decisions are nearly impossible. The unpredictability of the portfolio outcome may
drive managers to make educated guesses based on past experiences with portfolio successes and
failures. Managers are faced with the challenge of thinking clearly in the midst of high demands
and accountability for future failed projects. The portfolio decisions of these pharma managers
can ultimately lead to blockbuster drugs that generate high levels of return on investment or sunk
costs that lead to severe declines in R&D productivity. Managers anticipate the regrets and
consequences of bad outcomes, while attempting to make the best portfolio selections. They seek
out empirical methods that have the potential to delusively promise the achievement of high
revenue growth goals. Prior research has shown that adhering to PfM processes alone will not
suffice for building a profitable portfolio.
Many PfM processes are rushed, especially in the climate of consolidation where pharma
mergers and takeover bids are often used as cost-saving measures (Lo, 2015). These cost-saving
measures include the streamlining of operations and termination of R&D activity (Lo, 2015).
Managers who are responsible for PfM generally follow standardized processes. These
managers make PfM decisions as a result of investor demands. These type decisions are often
executed quickly, and the behaviors that drive such decisions may not be well understood.
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During a merger, pharma R&D departments are the last to integrate, as a firm’s pipeline
and patents are its most prized assets and are not revealed to competitors in case the deal falls
through ("Hold you horses: M&A is about talent, not just pipelines," 2013). It can take up nine
months to merge departments, which is inevitably stressful and time-consuming for management
and employees ("Hold you horses: M&A is about talent, not just pipelines," 2013). During this
critical period, no new projects are undertaken, and important decisions are made about the
merged firm’s portfolio. One way to explain how these decisions are made is by exploring the
behaviors of the managers throughout the PfM process.

I.2

Conceptual Framework
This study will focus on the area of PfM. The problem setting is the R&D departments

within pharma firms. Managers’ behaviors will be examined in the context of merger conditions.
The conceptual framework for this research is displayed in Figure 1. A summary of the research
style components is shown in Exhibit A-1 of Appendix A. Table 3 displays the definition of
terms used in the study.
The next section presents the literature findings on PfM and how it’s leveraged in
collaboration with R&D activities within the pharma industry, the impact of M&A on PfM, and
the presentation of the decision-based theory that will be applied to this research. Thereafter, the
methodology is outlined.
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Table 3 Definitions of Key Terms Used in This Study
Term
Definition
Portfolio
A collection of programs, projects and operations managed as a group.
Portfolio
A set of activities that allow a firm to select, develop, and commercialize a
Management pipeline of new products aligned with the firm’s strategy that will enable it
to continue to grow profitably over the long term.
Project
A pharmaceutical drug product within any given therapeutic area.
Manager
A portfolio management decision-maker within at firm who is responsible
for making decisions regarding what drugs go into a portfolio.
Merger and
A general term used to refer to the consolidation of companies. This study
Acquisition
involves horizontal pharmaceutical mergers.
Merger
A set of activities that occur during M&A, such as pre- and post-merger
Activities
portfolio selection.
Phase I/Early The first clinical trials in which the drug is administered to healthy human
Phase
volunteers.
Development
Phase II
Clinical trials in which the drug is administered to human patients with the
disease by using the results of dosing studies from Phase I.
Phase III/Late This clinical trial phase includes large-scale clinical studies on humans
Stage
with the disease. The FDA is involved and indicates benchmarks for
Development giving their approval. In addition to confirming the efficacy, these studies
identify drug interactions, human demographics, and so forth.
Clinical
A rigorously controlled test of a new drug or a new invasive medical
Study/Trial
device on human subjects. In the United States it is conducted under the
direction of the FDA before being made available for general clinical use.
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Figure 1 Conceptual Framework
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II

LITERATURE REVIEW

II.1 Portfolio Management
Definition. A portfolio is a collection of programs, projects and operations managed as a
group ("PMI," 2015). The components of a portfolio may not necessarily be interdependent or
even related—but they are managed together as a group to achieve strategic objectives ("PMI,"
2015). PfM practitioners rely on two main organizations for guidance on providing frameworks
for managing portfolios, Project Management Institute (PMI) and the United Kingdom’s Office
of Government Commerce (OGC). These organizations provide methodologies and frameworks
for managing portfolios, programs, and projects. Firms have adopted various forms of these
PfM frameworks, including the use of project evaluation and decision criteria control routines
and other means to formalize their project PfM (Martinsuo, 2013). The common objective of
these organizations is to provide tools, techniques, and processes to aid in the delivery of projects
aligned with its strategic goals. Additionally, these organizations offer training and
certifications for practitioners across many industries. The most common portfolio certification
credentials are Portfolio Management Professional (PfMP) and Manager of Portfolio Practitioner
(MoP), administered by PMI and OGC, respectively.
PMI defines PfM as the centralized management of one or more portfolios, which
includes identifying, prioritizing, authorizing, managing, and controlling projects, programs, and
other related work to achieve specific strategic business objectives ("PMI," 2015). United
Kingdom’s Office of Government Commerce’s definition of PfM is a coordinated collection of
strategic processes and decisions that together enable the most effective balance of
organizational change and business as usual (Commerce, 2008). For this study, PfM is defined
as a set of activities that allow a firm to select, develop, and commercialize a pipeline of new
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products aligned with a strategy that will enable it to continue to grow profitably over the long
term (Kester et al., 2011). Further, this study will focus on pharma PfM, as opposed to
information technology and financial PfM.
Portfolio management spans across multiple industries and is one of the major business
functions within an innovative firm. If not managed proficiently and in line with the firm’s
strategy, the negative impact of poor portfolio decisions can be significant (Kester et al., 2011).
According to Bode-Greuel and Nickisch (2008), successful PfM must be sufficiently detailed,
interdisciplinary, consistent, and embedded in a practicable corporate process. The process of
developing a portfolio to deliver a firm’s or department’s strategy should take into account
operational priorities as well as strategic priorities (Commerce, 2008).
Portfolio Management Office. The PfM office ideally reports to the head of R&D or the
chief executive officer. According to Bode-Greuel and Nickisch (2008), the most effective
organizational model is one in which the PfM function is closely linked to the strategy and
project management entity within the firm, jointly reporting to either the chief executive office or
another Board member that is not responsible for R&D. According to OGC, the portfolio office
should report directly to a main board director to ensure that it has sufficient influence over
investment decisions (Commerce, 2008). This reporting structure is critical because managers
who are responsible for portfolios need to have buy-in and guidance from senior management
and investors to provide strategies for making the PfM process effective. The PMI Pulse study
has identified five key drivers of effective PfM: senior management receptivity, competent
portfolio governance, standardized metrics and criteria, consistency and logic of organizational
strategic objectives, and mature project management office (PMI, 2012). Effective PfM also
includes metrics and criteria. Figure 2 displays metrics used across industries as reported Bode-

12
Greul and Nickisch (2008). Project Management Institute’s Pulse of Profession In-Depth Report
(PMI, 2012), stated that organizations that are effective in PfM had 62% of products meet or
exceed return on investment (ROI).

Figure 2 PfM Process in Fully Integrated Firms
(Bode-Greuel and Nickisch (2008)
Portfolio Management Process. According to Bode-Greuel and Nickisch (2008), a
typical PfM process includes the evaluation of development milestones and probabilities
(decision-tree meetings). The commercial analysis (marketing meetings) of individual projects
is usually performed at the project team level, followed by a senior management review of the
key assumptions across projects facilitates the establishment of valid and consistent assumptions
(Bode-Greuel & Nickisch, 2008). Bode-Greul and Nickisch (2008) stated that project
management is the predominant operative instrument for the execution of portfolio decisions. A
typical PfM process is displayed in Figure 3. As capacity constraints may limit the operational
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execution of portfolio decisions, effective communication, and interaction with functions
facilitates the translation of project prioritization decisions into feasible actions (Bode-Greuel &
Nickisch, 2008). Bode-Greul (2008) identified four common tools that are applied to align
project management with portfolio decisions: target product profile (TPP), a stage-gate decision
process, timeline and budget management, and sales forecast aligned with TPP and development
plan. A TPP serves as a blueprint of the desired future product (Bode-Greuel & Nickisch, 2008).
The stage-gate decision process is related to the major preclinical and clinical development
milestones and is also a well-established principle in the pharma industry (Bode-Greuel &
Nickisch, 2008). At each stage-gate, it is decided whether the achieved results support
continuation of development, and the project may be reprioritized depending on other projects
competing for resources (Bode-Greuel & Nickisch, 2008). Sales forecasting and financial
project evaluation are undertaken to a variable extent and level of detail, depending on firms’
policies at which development stage quantitative analyses should commence (Bode-Greuel &
Nickisch, 2008).
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Figure 3 Commonly Applied PfM Metrics
(Bode-Greuel & Nickisch, 2008)
II.2 R&D Portfolio Management
Extending PfM to the R&D function adds complexity and the need for effective portfolio
selection models. Research and development managers often view PfM in terms of strategy and
valuation. Wang and Hwang (2007) presented a simple fuzzy multi-criteria R&D portfolio
decision model that represented project appraisals for each criterion as a fuzzy set and developed
an algorithm to find non-dominated solutions. Multifactorial analyses should be a routine part of
any R&D portfolio assessment to account for all of the parameters that could impact a portfolio
profile. The most effective use of the PfM activity is not the value calculation at the end, but
rather how information is effectively used to help develop, define, and carry out an overall
business strategy (Tiggemann, Dworaczyk, & Sabel, 1998).
Tiggemann et al. (1998) presented four points that need to be considered when managing
projects within an R&D portfolio: (1) probability-weighted net present value (expected NPV),
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(2) long-term versus short-term balance of risk and strategic business needs, (3) balance of
territory-specific versus global strategic business needs, and (4) organizational ability, capability,
expertise, and resources. These considerations should be included in pharma PfM criteria when
trying to consolidate portfolios after a merger. Another consideration is to recognize and
properly deal with personal biases of managers (Tiggemann et al., 1998). Biases could deter
managers from effectively managing a pharma R&D portfolio.

II.3 Pharmaceutical Portfolio Management
Standard Approach to Portfolio Management. According to Kester, Griffin, Hultink
and Lauche (2011), pharmaceuticals are one of the most mature industries in PfM. This maturity
comes from the fact that pharma firms may have an abundance of project alternatives at every
level of the drug development process, where continuous decisions must be made for a constant
pipeline of products. An overview of the FDA drug development process is displayed in Table
4. Today, no major pharma firm is without some type of centralized PfM function with wide
ranging responsibilities including strategy development, decision making and resource allocation
(Grainger, 2014). The impact of rising and falling productivity levels has led pharma firms to
pay closer attention to their portfolios and look into the various ways in which they are managed.
The pharma industry uses PfM to evaluate the commercial value and the risk structure of
development projects (Bode-Greuel & Nickisch, 2008). Standard approaches to PfM in the
biopharma industry involve sizing R&D portfolios as a function of expected revenues, and
making inclusion–exclusion decisions on a compound-by-compound basis (Evans, Hinds, &
Hammock, 2009). Although most pharma firms have adopted PfM, the process for managing
portfolios vary based upon firm size, culture, and corporate governance and structure. Smith and
Sonnenblick (2013) found the success of the new PfM process is dependent on having a strong
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portfolio group with access to the project data, the ability to manipulate the data to answer whatif questions, and access to executives who would listen to the insights gleaned from the analyses.
PfM within the pharma industry involves the selection of products that are expected to deliver
growth and sustain R&D operations. Historically, the pharma industry has prided itself on
investing more in R&D (as a percentage of revenues) than any other industry (LaMattina, 2011).
The portfolio selection methods employed by firms such as the “BIG Three” are primarily
focused on quantitative modeling methods. The common denominator of these methods presents
the selection decision as a rational, evidence-based rigorous comparison of numbers (Kester et
al., 2011). There is a general agreement in the pharma industry that the evaluation of projects
entering full development after a successful proof of concept (PoC) should include quantitative
financial parameters (Bode-Greuel & Nickisch, 2008). Interestingly, firms relying solely on
financial methods for project selection and decision making perform worse than other firms
(Kester et al., 2011). There are various portfolio methods that are utilized within pharma R&D.
Common methods include: (a) discounted cash flow (DCF), (b) decision-tree analysis, (c) real
options, (d) expert opinion, (e) sensitivity analysis, (f) internal rate of return (IRR), (g) pharma
reviews, (h) stage-gates, (i) and net present value (NPV).
Pharmaceutical Portfolio Valuation and Selection Models. Project selection is one of
the first and most critical activities in PfM (Kaiser, El Arbi, & Ahlemann, 2015). Portfolio
selection is a process characterized by uncertainty and changing information: new opportunities
arise, multiple goals as well as strategic considerations are required, and interdependence among
projects (either when competing for scarce resources or when synergies are achieved) exist,
multiple decision-makers and locations (Kaiser et al., 2015). Gupta and Wilemon (as cited by
Blau, Pekny, Varma, & Bunch, 2004) stated that a portfolio must be selected in such a way that
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the competition among drug candidates for limited resources does not result in unusually long
average product development times and hence late commercialization.
Deciding from a pool of available and competing projects is a complex decision (Kaiser
et al., 2015). Many managers mistakenly assume that the selection of good projects yield a
profitable portfolio. However, managers have to consider multiple project dimensions and
intuitively decide how adding or removing a specific project would have an impact on the
portfolio (Kaiser et al., 2015). Smith and Sonnenblick (2013) stated the goal of PfM is not to
pick which projects are the best but to pick the best set of projects to achieve the firm’s goals.
The selection of a project can be determined at any interval during the drug development process
as displayed in Table 4.

Table 4 Overview of the Drug Development Process
(Adapted from Dimasi, Hansen, and Grabowski (2003) as cited on www.fdareview.org)
Preclinical
Toxicology

Investigational
New Drug
Application

Clinical
Phase I
Phase II

Safety

Expenses
Time
1 to 6
years
Overall probability of success

Safety
dosing
efficacy
$15.2
$23.4
million
million
21.6
25.7
months
months
6 to 11 years

Phase III

Approval
New Drug
Application

Market
Phase IV /
Post market
surveillance

0.6 to 2 years

11 to 14
years

Safety
efficacy
side effects
$86.5
million
30.5
months

30%

14%

9%

8%

Conditional probability of success
40%
75%

48%

64%

90%

Note: The line marked “Overall probability of success” is the unconditional probability of reaching a given stage.
For example, 30 percent of drugs make it to phase I testing. The line marked “Conditional probability of success”
shows the probability of advancing to the next stage of the process conditional on reaching a given stage. For
example, the probability of advancing to Phase III testing conditional on starting Phase II testing is 48 percent.
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Bole-Greul and Nickisch (2008) indicated the following common set of criteria used to
evaluate pharma projects for portfolio selection: (1) scoring around market size, attractiveness,
and competitiveness, (2) high, medium, or low cost, either for research cost alone, or including
development cost, (3) time to entry into clinical development / PoC / launch, expected time per
milestone, (4) score against therapeutic area strategy, (5) scoring against TPP and milestone
criteria. Other criteria may include rankings of low, medium and high for: Innovation potential,
specificity, efficacy, tolerability, appropriate early clinical PoC / availability of biomarkers,
preclinical feasibility, clinical feasibility, degree of unmet medical need, competitiveness,
number and categories of competitors, patent status, peak sale potential, and potential follow-on
indications (Bode-Greuel & Nickisch, 2008).
Discounted Cash Flow. Chapman and Ward (as cited by Blau et al., 2004) reported that
the earliest PfM techniques applied in the pharma industry were based on economic analysis.
One of these methods, DCF, is defined as the present value of a company’s future cash flows.
Discounted cash flow is calculated by dividing projected annual earnings over an extended
period by an appropriate discount rate, which is the weighted cost of raising capital by issuing
debt or equity ("Discounted cash flow," 2011). According to Krishnan and Ulrich (as cited by
Blau et al., 2004) the DCF method remains the most commonly used valuation method.
However, Poh, Ang, and Bai (as cited by Blau et al., 2004) argued that DCF is based on expected
values of uncertain parameters and is unable to generate quantitative details about the risk
associated with a given drug candidate.
Decision-tree Analysis. Decision tree analysis is an effective tool used to illustrate R&D
decision points, the probabilities of uncertain outcomes at each milestone, and potentially
resulting decision options (Bode-Greuel & Nickisch, 2008). Sharpe and Keelin (as cited by
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Blau et al., 2004) indicated that decision trees allow management to undertake complex resource
allocation decisions among competing drug candidates with full consideration to the possibilities
of drug failures. Decision trees serve as a communication tool for FM, project management and
line functions (Bode-Greuel & Nickisch, 2008). Ding and Eliashberg (as cited by Blau et al.,
2004) reported that the decision tree method also has addressed PfM issues such as how many
projects to pursue and how many projects to terminate.
Real Options. The real options approach is used in capital market theory to determine
valuation of risky R&D projects (Wang & Hwang, 2007). Real options are defined as the
situation in which an investor can choose between two different investments, where both choices
are tangible assets ("Real Options," 2011). The first reported practical use of a portfolio
selection strategy is the application of the real options pricing valuation model presented above
by Merck and Co. (Hartmann & Hassan, 2006). The results of a study reported by Hartmann and
Hassan (2006) indicate that real options pricing, despite its valuation models, have not seen a
high rate of adoption within the pharma industry.

This lack of adoption may be attributed to a

finding by Copeland and Antikarov (as cited by Blau et. al., 2004) that in practice, the real
options method has been used effectively only to evaluate single projects. In pharma, multiple
projects across various therapeutic areas are evaluated simultaneously, and final selections form
a portfolio.
Expert Opinion and Sensitivity Analysis. Research shows that pharma portfolio
managers rely heavily on expert opinion and in-house calculations obtained by sensitivity and
scenario analysis (Hartmann & Hassan, 2006). Sensitivity and scenario analysis involve
changing one or more of the values supplied for the payoffs, costs, and probabilities, then
rerunning the procedure for selecting optimum portfolio (Martino, 1995). Expert opinion is
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defined as a statement from a specialist on a particular subject. These opinions could be based on
past and present experiences of subject matter experts.
Internal Rate of Return and Net Present Value. For any given portfolio, there is a
planning horizon for the time in which the portfolio is being considered, a budget for the total
amount of money available for the selected projects and minimum performance requirements
such as a minimum IRR or a minimum NPV (Kaiser et al., 2015). Internal rate of return is
defined as the discount rate at which the cash inflow on an investment equals its cash outflow
("NPV," 2011). Net present value is defined as the present value of the expected future cash
flows minus the cost ("NPV," 2011). In most pharma portfolio processes, projects are ranked
according to their NPV. This method is the most understood by investors, managers and finance
teams and is commonly used a decision-making component. Projects with a positive NPV are
favored over those with negative NPVs. Evans et al. (2009) identified two crucial inadequacies
of the NPV approach when used a sole determination: (1) it fails to distinguish between projects
offering comparable returns but different levels of risk, and (2) it fails to provide a cumulative
measure of risk and returns at the whole-portfolio level. Tiggemann et al. (1998) corroborated
this notion by stating that a priority ranking of R&D projects from the highest down to the lowest
probability weighted NPV will fail. Therefore, managers are not holistically informed to make a
critical portfolio decision using NPV alone.
Reviews and Stage-Gates. Once a portfolio has been defined, portfolio reviews are
conducted once or twice a year. Portfolio reviews are defined as qualitative and quantitative
evaluations consisting of parameters such as: strategic fit, degree of innovation, NPV and
expected value uptake, project productivity, sales, probability of launch, time to launch, and cost
(Bode-Greuel & Nickisch, 2008). Pharma R&D portfolio reviews are extensive and time-
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consuming, as they require careful consideration of scientific issues such as efficacy and safety
data for each product, as well as commercial issues such as potential duplication and strategic
directions of the merged firm (LaMattina, 2011). These reviews are sometimes rushed as a
result of approaching deadlines and environmental conditions. Portfolio reviews are helpful
because they usually involve many levels of management and key decision-makers. According
to Bode-Greul and Nickisch (2008), portfolio decisions are best achieved in an interactive way
because individual opinions and attitudes become transparent, paving the way for consensus and
compromise increasing the chance that decisions are respected and translated into action on the
operational level.
A stage-gate is defined as a phased project management approach that produces factbased funding decisions based on a set of defined evaluation criteria. According to O’Connor
(1994) (as cited by Blau et al., 2004), the stage-gate process appears mainly focused on tactical
decisions such as regulating the flow of work in the pipeline rather than on strategic decisions
such as project selection and sequencing.
II.4 Pharmaceutical Portfolio Management and Post-Merger Integration

M&A Objectives. Richey, Kiessling, Tokman, & Dalela (2008) (as cited by Oh, Peters,
& Johnston, 2014) state that M&As have been used as a market growth strategy. Still today,
firms continue to pursue M&As with the expectation of significant growth. Table 5 presents 20
goals or objectives for M&As derived from Kitching 167; Howell, 1970, Steiner, 1975 (as cited
by Walter and Barney, 1990). The most common goals or objectives pharma managers align
with items 2, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 20 of Table 5. These objectives aim to enhance capabilities,
improve efficiencies, penetrate new markets, utilize talent, and integrate technologies of the
acquired firm. Portfolio management objectives are to divest poor-performing drugs. Prior
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research has shown the goal to attain immediate growth is realized. However, the merged entity
eventually suffers and experience lower performance.
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Table 5 Managerial Goals of M&A
Walter and Barney (1990)
Item
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Goal
Promote visibility with investors, bankers, or governments, with an eye to subtle
benefits later.
Accelerate growth or reduce risks and costs in a particular industry in which the
acquiring company has a strength such as executive wisdom.
Utilize interlocking and mutually stimulating(synergistic) qualities of the acquired
company vis-a-vis the acquiring company.
Attain improved competitiveness inherent in holding a sizeable market share or
important market position.
Utilize financial strengths of the acquired company such as foreign tax credits or
borrowing capacity.
Gain complementary financial features such as those that balance earnings
cyclicality.
Reduce risks and costs of diversifying products and services delivered to customers
within an industry.
Utilize the acquiring company's expertise in marketing, production, or other areas
within the acquired company.
Divest poor-performing elements of the otherwise undervalued acquired company,
in portfolio management style.
Improve efficiencies and reduce risk in the supply of specific goods and/or services
to the acquiring company.
Penetrate new markets by utilizing the acquired company's marketing capacities.
Improve economies of scale by utilizing the acquired company's distributional
capacities to absorb expanded output.
Gain valuable or potentially valuable assets with the cash flow or other financial
strengths of the acquiring firm.
Broaden the customer base for existing goods and services of the acquiring
company.
Create economies of scale by relevant capacity expansion.
Reduce risks and costs of entering a new industry.
Expand capacity at less cost than assembling new facilities, equipment, and/or
physical assets.
Fulfill the personal ambitions, vision, or some particular goal of the acquiring
company's chief executive.
Pursue opportunities to sell stock at a profit by such acts as pressing management of
the acquired firm for improved earnings.
Utilize the acquired company's personnel, skills, or technology in other operations
of the acquiring company.

M&A Process and Impact on Firm. M&A activity is likely to occur when one firm is
performing low and another firm is seeking market expansion (Campbell, Sirmon, & Schijven,
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2016). In this scenario, the high performing firm would acquire the low performing firm. These
acquiring firms can acquire same and smaller size firms. Investors perceive the acquiring firm as
having sufficient capital to maximize the acquisition. According to Campbell et al. (2016),
investors pursue acquisitions when the acquiring firm is strategically and organizationally fit,
have strong performance, and leverage experience. They influence board members and the
executive team to acquire the low-performing firms. The traditional steps of the acquisition
process are shown in Figure 4.

Phase 1:
Strategic
Objective

Phase 6:
Agreement

Phase 2:
Searching and
Screening

Phase 5:
Negotiation

Phase 3:
Strategic
Evaluation

Phase 4:
Financial
Evaluation

Phase 7:
Integration

Figure 4 Traditional view of the acquisition process
Adapted from Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991) (as cited by Angwin, Paroutis, & Connell, 2015)
The low-performing firms are usually acquired by larger firms. However, larger firms
can also acquire firms of equal size. Cartwright and Cooper, 1993 (as cited by Oh et al., 2014)
state that smaller firms are known to adopt the changes that are introduced by the larger
acquiring firm. The acquiring and acquired firms form a perception about that the culture of the
merged entity, even before the merger takes place (Cartwright and Cooper, 1993 as cited by Oh
et al., 2014). In a quantitative study conducted by Oh et al. (2014), it was discovered that postmerger performance deterioration due to the conflict in organizational cultures is greater in
acquisitions involving larger target firms than in acquisitions of smaller target firms.
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Research from the Harvard Business School found that 86% of M&A failed to achieve
their goals and expectations (Bart & Schreiber, 2013). Until strategies are set forth and executed
to address the challenges with culture, talent retention, strategy alignment and integration, this
declining trend may continue.

Post-Merger Integration. According to Shrivastava (1986), the ability to integrate two
entities into one is a major concern for most firms. Technologies, procedures, accounting
systems, and physical assets are among the first and easiest to be integrated. Studies conducted
by Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger, & Weber, 1992 and Kusewitt, 1985 (as cited by Campbell,
2016 ) reveal that the closer the firms are in size, the higher the likelihood that they will face
integration difficulties. In many cases, the acquiring and the acquired firms are large, which
further complicates mergers.
Culture is one of the hardest components to integrate. Oh et al., (2014) indicate that
conflict in firm cultures is only temporarily influential in affecting post-merger performance, and
executing the right strategy to gain merger synergies could make integration more successful.
Schweizer and Patzelt (2012) emphasize the importance of human elements in the
integration process. Increased turnover among key R&D personnel and key managers following
an acquisition results in the loss of valuable knowledge and expertise which limits knowledge
transfer (Canella & Hambrick, 1993; Ranft & Lord, 2000 as cited by Schweizer and Patzelt,
2012). McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Podolny (1994) drew on the behavioral decision-making
perspective that employees from acquired firms leave to avoid the substantial uncertainties as a
result of the integration (as cited by Schweizer and Patzelt, 2012).
Shrivastava (1986) estimated that almost half to two thirds of all mergers fail as a result
of faulty integration. Decades of failed mergers have been documented in the literature. In
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1981, Exxon Inc. bought Reliance Electric Firm for $1.2 billion but failed as a result of poor
integration (Shrivastava, 1986).
Other factors that complicate the post-merger integration of firms are the diverse motives
behind these mergers, the diverse strategies used to acquire firms, and complex technologies and
production systems that need to be integrated after the merger (Shrivastava, 1986). Managerial
motives for mergers vary from the creation of financial value for stockholders to the almost
altruistic, friendly, saving gesture on the part of the acquiring firm (Shrivastava, 1986).
Schrivastava (1986) identified three types of post-merger integrations: (1) procedural
integration, (2) physical integration, and (3) managerial and sociocultural integration. Since one
of the contexts of this study is R&D, we will focus on physical integration. If the postintegration process is badly managed, an acquisition can imply a potential disruption in the
established routines of the merging firm and in its newly acquired component, and thereby even
reduce R&D productivity (Cassiman, Colombo, Garrone, & Veugelers, 2005). Physical
integration involves the consolidation of product lines, production technologies, R&D projects,
plant and equipment, and real estate assets (Shrivastava, 1986). The integration of these
components is costly, labor intensive and time-consuming and must be managed properly.
Product line integration involves the evaluation and assessment of existing products and its
strategic alignment with that of the acquirer. A decision will be made to either terminate or
divest a product line. Integration of production technologies involve screening and divesting
redundant production facilities or transferring production systems across divisional and firm
boundaries, as well as integrating existing plants and equipment (Shrivastava, 1986). Mergers
may result in the relocation of plant and equipment in efforts to reduce production costs,
inventory holding costs, and the cost of transporting goods to markets (Shrivastava, 1986). The
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integration of immovable real estate assets primarily involves revaluation of properties and their
allocation to appropriate functions (Shrivastava, 1986). Pre-merger analysis and valuation of
real estate assets very often do not take into account the rapid escalation of property prices,
especially properties located in urban areas, which could significantly negatively impact stock
prices of the merged company (Shrivastava, 1986).
Increased financial leverage from M&A activities affects the financing of R&D activities
by increasing the opportunity cost of funds allocated to R&D, leading to elimination of R&D
projects and/or a higher risk-aversion in R&D project selection (Cassiman et al., 2005).
According to Cassiman et al. (2005), M&A activity can yield favorable results when (1) firms
are involved in M&As for technology sourcing purposes; (2) the M&A integration process is
effectively managed; (3) firms are able to retain key people, and, (4) firms have a strong own
internal know-how base, which allows to better evaluate potential targets and to realize synergies
from combining know-how from the target and acquiring firm.
Big pharma firms have demonstrated that, despite the inevitable disruption caused by the
mergers, they end up better off (Bershidsky, 2014). A report by the management consulting firm
McKinsey & Co. found that of the 11 pharma firms that have remained in the global Top-20
since 1995, seven have made acquisitions worth more than $10 billion each (Bershidsky, 2014).
Median excess returns for megamergers were positive, showing returns 5 percent above the
industry index two years after a deal's announcement (Bershidsky, 2014). Despite these
growths, prior research shows that R&D portfolios suffer from budget cuts and a decline in
investments. Undergoing one merger will have a substantial negative impact on the momentum
of research portfolios, but enduring this multiple times can be crippling (LaMattina, 2011).
According to LaMattina (2011), after a major pharma merger, the rate of progress of compounds
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in the development pipeline seems to decrease. For example, comparing data from
PharmaZeta’s pipeline updates before the Wyeth merger in February 2008 and in February 2011,
40% of the compounds (not including those from Wyeth) had been in Phase II development for
more than three years, which is below the industry average (LaMattina, 2011). To our
knowledge, there is no data that show the behaviors of managers responsible for selecting a
portfolio that have negatively impacted R&D after a merger. The next section will discuss the
theory that will be used to analyze the behaviors demonstrated by managers throughout the PfM
process.

II.5 Theory of Narrative Thought
Origin and Definition. Theory of Narrative Thought (TNT) is a theory from the field of
naturalistic decision making (Rutten, Dorée, & Halman, 2013). The central goal in the field of
naturalistic decision-making research is to understand how people actually make decisions in
real-world settings (Rutten et al., 2013). The naturalistic decision framework was initiated in
1989 in a conference in Dayton, Ohio, sponsored by the Army Research Institute (Lipshitz,
Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001). According to Lipshitz et al (2001), the original definition
emphasized the shaping features of the contexts in which many decisions of interest were made:
ill-structured problems, uncertainty, dynamic environments, shifting, ill-defined, or competing
goals, multiple event-feedback loops, time constraints, high stakes, multiple players, and
organizational settings, where expertise was included as a secondary factor. This approach
would appear to fit the M&A context based on the shaping features of that context.
Classical approaches to decision making, such as Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis
(MAUA) and Decision Analysis, prescribe analytical and systematic methods to weigh evidence
and select an optimal course of action (Klein, 2008). Other decision-making theories are
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economic based and lack the cognitive elements that help explain decisions made in real-world
settings using memory from past and present experiences. Hence, TNT was chosen to help
answer our research question and provide rich insights into the behaviors that drive portfolio
decisions during post-merger PfM processes. The antecedents of TNT are described in Exhibit
A-2 of Appendix A. These theories help derive the core constructs of TNT, which include:
narratives, forecasts, decisions and actions. These constructs explain how the cognitive abilities:
memory, perception, imagination, and decision making shape R&D portfolio management
decisions in the aftermath of a pharma merger.
TNT Concepts. Theory of Narrative Thought’s view of decision making is built on the
notion that decision-makers’ narratives play a key role in decision making (Rutten et al., 2013).
Decision-makers’ narratives are the stories they tell themselves (both consciously and
unconsciously) about what happened in the past and what is happening in the present
(perception). It is a rich mixture of memories and cognitive images that enable a person to
forecast what will happen in the future (Rutten et al., 2013). When a person decides that all or
part of the forecasted future is undesirable, they make further decisions about what actions to
take to ensure the arrival of the actual future is desirable. A comprehensive list of constructs for
TNT is displayed and defined in Table 6.
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Table 6 TNT Constructs
Beach (2010)
Construct
Narratives

Action
Forecast
Decisions
Resultant
Action
Imagination
Memory
Narrative
Thought
Rules
Values

Decision
Making
Plan

Desired Future

Definition
A rich mixture of memories, visual, auditory, and other cognitive
images, all laced together by emotions to form a mixture that far
surpasses mere words and visual images in their ability to capture
context and meaning. Narratives are the stories that we tell ourselves
and what we are told by others.
An educated guess about how the future might unfold if you make an
effort to intervene or change it.
The way you shape the future to conform to your values.
The outcome of an implemented plan that conforms to your values and
desired future.
The ability to use information about the past and present to forecast the
future.
The ability to retain, retrieve, and use information about the past.
The proposition that narratives are the vehicle for cognitively
constructing the past, present and future is the theory of narrative
thought.
Explicit steps used for manipulating both cognitive and physical events
so that your actions achieve their desired ends.
Ethics, and your ideas of equity, justice, solidarity, stewardship, truth,
beauty, and goodness, together with your moral, civic, and religious
precepts and the responsibilities you assume in the course of
performing your daily duties and engaging in social interactions.
The ability to detect that a forecasted future is undesirable, to select
actions that will promote a desirable future, and to monitor the actions
progress toward achieving the alternative future.
A sequence of potential actions designed to influence crucial junctures
in the unfolding course of events in order to transform what you
otherwise forecast to be an undesirable future into a desirable future.
The alternative future that your intervention is designed to achieve.

Application of TNT. The overarching concept of TNT is that human beings take charge
of their situations by understanding how the future derives from the past and present, and using
that knowledge to guide actions aimed at making the future more desirable than it might
otherwise be (Beach, 2010). A theoretical model of TNT is displayed in Figure 5. The
constructs of TNT are being used in this study to explain the behaviors that drive managers to
make R&D portfolio management decisions after a pharma merger. We chose TNT because its
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constructs help explain how conscious, unconscious, and intuitive decisions are formed and
organized during the PfM process. The theoretical framework for this study is illustrated in
Figure 6.

Memory

Rules

Imagina on

Values

Ac on
Forecast

Narra ves

Decisions

Narra ve
Thought

Plans

Knowledge

DecisionMaking

Desired
Future

Plan Execu on Resultant

Ac on

Figure 5 TNT Model
(Derived from Beach, 2010)
First, we determined if professional and personal experiences, both past and present,
shape the decisions of leaders faced with the responsibility of choosing the right projects to grow
and sustain the R&D pipeline while conforming to the complexities of organization disruption
caused by M&A. Consistent with the logic of the theoretical model, we explored how these
professional and personal experiences, or others, influenced portfolio decisions. We discovered
how the portfolio is managed until an attractive and promising portfolio is attained.
Second, the naturalistic nature of TNT allowed us to assess the thought processes of

32
leaders in this setting. The context is the R&D departments that encompass the combined drug
portfolio of at least two merged entities. The condition of the R&D department post-merger is
delicate and uncertain, and leaders are faced with the responsibility of making critical decisions.
The department at the merged state is complex, and is met with an abundance of drugs that may
have conflicting implications, development constraints, and unexpected costs. Continuing with
the logic of theoretical model, the future state of the portfolio is envisioned, and strategic plans
are composed from the minds of the decision-makers. These decision-makers combined current
sensory and memory information to produce an image of the merged firm’s portfolio condition.
If the current condition of the portfolio was not attractive, decision-makers revised the strategic
plans as new knowledge is discovered and transform these plans into actions. This process
repeated until the desired state of the portfolio met the standards (rules) of a revenue-generating
pipeline.
Third, TNT enabled us to explore the behaviors of managers while making PfM
decisions. To initiate the post-merger portfolio process, initial discussions about integrating the
R&D organizations occur and the initial focus is on Phase III programs, followed by mid-stage
candidates, with the early-stage discovery programs handled last (LaMattina, 2011). These
reviews are extensive and time-consuming, as they require careful consideration of scientific
issues, such as efficacy and safety data for each program, as well as commercial issues such as
potential duplication and strategic directions of the merged firm (LaMattina, 2011). This
thinking, as described by TNT, is comprised of the decision-makers’ narratives, forecasted
actions, and rules. Narratives are a mixture of memories (visual, auditory, and other cognitive
images), all laced together by emotions to form a mixture that far surpasses mere words and
visual images in their ability to capture context and meaning (Beach, 2010). Narratives are the
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vehicle for cognitively constructing the past, present, and future (Beach, 2010). Rules tell the
decision-maker what to expect as a result of something he or she does, and what to expect as a
result of actions by other people and the natural environment (Rutten et al., 2013). These rules
are then applied to produce an action based on forecasts (or predictions) of what the future
should look like. Drawing on the process model of the theory, our notion is that narratives of
decision-makers comprised of experiences from former post-merger R&D portfolio failures,
their ideas of what can be done today to prevent future failures, and how they envision the
success of selecting the right portfolio to contribute to the success of the firm as well as
themselves.

Figure 6 Theoretical Framework
(Derived from Beach (2010)
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II.6 Literature Gap
According to Lamattina (2011), leaders of organizations who have completed multiple
mergers may express the view: “We’ve done this before, and we know how to do it.” However,
prior literature reveals that the complexities of post-merger integration, coupled with the
turbulence of R&D portfolio disruptions, ultimately lead to negative impacts to the R&D
pipeline. Much of the PfM literature is based on a rational idea of how the involved managers
make decisions based mainly on financial data to optimize resulting changes in the portfolio. A
summary of the prior findings on PfM in practice, PfM and post-merger integration, R&D PfM
and Pharma PfM in the literature are displayed in Tables 7, 8, 9 and 10, respectively. Henriksen
and Traynor (as cited by by Martinsuo, 2013) found that despite the project PfM frameworks and
their well-intended portfolio analyses and investment optimizations during portfolio planning,
project PfM models alone don’t allow for optimum PfM decisions. A six-year case study
conducted by Smith and Sonneblick (2013) demonstrated that most managers felt that the PfM
process was extremely political, and projects were selected based upon how well its proponents
lobbied them in meetings. Despite these discoveries, the literature reveals that financial methods
are still the most popular models for PfM. The supporting theories for these methods are
economic-based, and provide little knowledge about the behaviors that drive the PfM decisions
that are made after M&A. Linton, Walsh, and Morabito (as cited by Blau et al., 2004) revealed
that economic analysis methods have been criticized for their rigid focus on single criteria
decision making versus more realistic multiple criteria decision making.
Our study addresses the literature gap surrounding the lack of research on the actual
behaviors that drive PfM decisions after a pharma merger. According to Martinsuo (2013), there
is a lack of awareness of what managers actually do during the PfM process and the unique
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conditions in which portfolios are managed are not fully known. Elonen and Artto (as cited by
Martinsuo, 2013) revealed that portfolio managers grant an insufficient amount of attention to
portfolio activities. Similarly, Cassiman et al. (2005) states that managerial time and effort spent
on managing M&A’s ex post may imply reduced attention to R&D projects. Our findings
provide insights into the behaviors that drive portfolio managers’ decisions, and help improve the
quality of post-merger R&D PfM processes. We reveal the unspoken objectives of managers
that influence portfolio decisions. This research addresses the gap in prior literature by applying
a qualitative, multiple-case study research approach to understanding portfolio managers’
behaviors while making PfM decisions during a merger.
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Table 7 Summary of recent empirical research on PPM in practice
(Adapted from Martinsuo, 2013)
Reference
Data and
Key findings
Emerging issues/new gaps
methodology
Aaltonen
Historical document- Variation, selection and
Causalities and managers'
(2010)
based event
retention in the evolution of
intentions and actions in
sequence study in a
a portfolio. Co-selection and PPM require further
single
path dependency in portfolio research
pharmaceutical firm decision making
Blichfeldt
Qualitative
Projects/activities outside of Official PPM differs from
and Eskerod interview-based
the official portfolio
the actual practice of PPM.
(2008)
study with 30 firms
consume and compete for
Negligence of the actual
in different
resources, which affects
reality endangers PPM
industries
PPM performance
success
Blomquist
Multi-method study: Project type explains certain Need to take into account
and Müller
interviews and
middle managers' roles in
project type in selecting
(2006)
questionnaire
PPM
PfM practices
Christiansen Qualitative, multiManagers do not follow the
Portfolio decision making as
and Varnes method single-case
rules agreed for PPM in their a negotiation and learning
(2008)
study in one
decision making, but they
process, despite the
organization
observe others, negotiate and existence of formal rules.
debate, and learn
Also the business context/
situation matters
Kester et al. Qualitative interview Three genres of portfolio
Attention needs to be paid
(2009)
study in 11
decision making: formaliston how people make
multinational firms
reactive, intuitive and
decisions in practice. More
integrative
empirical research is needed
Kester et al. Qualitative multiple- Decision making both as
Power and opinion-based
(2011)
case study, four
rational, political and
decision making, besides
firms in different
intuitive
evidence based. The model
industries
to be tested further
Killen et al.,
(2008b)

Questionnaire survey Selected PPM practices are
associated with better PPM
performance

Martinsuo
and
Lehtonen
(2007)

Questionnaire survey Goal setting, information
availability and systematic
decision making has a
significant effect on PPM
success
Qualitative
Managers' dispositional
embedded single
traits are proposed to be
case study
associated with project
portfolio

McNally et
al. (2009)

In-depth studies are needed
to further develop
frameworks of how PPM
practice and performance
are linked
What project managers do
have implications on the
portfolio level too

Managers' analytic cognitive
style, ambiguity tolerance
and leadership style
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Table 8 Summary of recent research on portfolio management and post-merger integration
Author
Research
Research Objective
Contribution
Method
Getz,
Quantitative Drug development
Provided insights into better
Zuckerman,
portfolio and spending
forecasting of drug
DiMasi, and
practices after Mergers
development productivity and
Kaitin (2009)
and acquisitions
resource requirements
following M&A transactions
Shibayama,
Qualitative
New perspectives for the Showed that engagement and
Tanikawa, and
management of M&A
non-rapid rationalization of
Kimura
process: A merger case the workforce can slow the
(2011)
of a Japanese
execution of the merger
pharmaceutical
process and delay efficiency
company
savings, and consistently drive
the merger process and place
the merged firm on a solid
foundation with strong
commitment from all levels
Demirbag,
Quantitative Performance of M&A in Revealed that no value
Ng, and
the pharmaceutical
creation was realized in terms
Tatoglu
industry: A comparative of research productivity,
(2007)
perspective
return on investment, and
profit margin

Table 9 Summary of key recent research on R&D portfolio management
Author
Research
Research Objective
Contribution
Method
Van Bekkum, Quantitative A real options
Contributed to real options
Pennings, and
perspective on R&D
theory by demonstrating the
Smit (2009)
portfolio diversification correlation between
conditional and unconditional
project and portfolio risk
Rutten, Doree, Qualitative
Exploring the value of a Applied decision-making
Halman
novel decision-making
theory to explain how
(2013)
theory in understanding managers progress decisions
R&D progress
are made in the context of the
decisions
sunk costs principle
Menke (2013) Benchmark
Making R&D portfolio Provided recommendations on
Study
management more
how to improve portfolio
effective
management processes to
make them more effective
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Table 10 Summary of key recent research on pharmaceutical portfolio management
Author
Research
Research Objective
Contribution
Method
Bode-Greul,
Qualitative
Value-driven project and
Described commonalities
Nickisch
portfolio management in
and differences of the
(2008)
the pharmaceutical industry: portfolio management
Drug discovery versus drug process in R&D and
Development provides
Commonalities
recommendations for
and differences in portfolio effective portfolio
management practice
management
Blau, Pekny,
Quantitative Managing a portfolio of
Proposes a computational
Varma, Bunch
interdependent new product portfolio management
(2004)
candidates in the
approach that selects a
pharmaceutical industry
sequence of projects
Smith and
Qualitative
From budget-based to
Provided insight into how
Sonnenblick
strategy-based portfolio
a pharmaceutical
(2013)
management: A six-year
company managed their
case study
portfolio and evolved
involved into a holistic
approach to portfolio
management

II.7 Research Objective

Research Question. Most literature takes a somewhat methodological perspective on PfM,
focusing on algorithms for optimizing portfolios and the general effectiveness of PfM (Kaiser et
al., 2015). In this study, we take a different approach. We are less concerned about ideas of how
portfolios are managed optimally. These ideas are financially and rationally focused and are
prescriptive for how managers should behave. We are more concerned about researching how
managers actually behave during the PfM process after a pharma merger. We used TNT to look
into the cognition of how they carried out PfM processes. We also used TNT to explore the role
of four universal human cognitive abilities: memory, perception, imagination, and decision
making, and to learn how these abilities translate into narratives that influence the decisions of
leaders within the pharma industry to help answer the following research question: How do
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pharma R&D managers make portfolio decisions during a merger? We applied this narrativebased decision theory to help managers better understand how portfolio decision-makers may use
past and present experiences to forecast the future and transform these strategic plans into actions
that lead to optimum portfolio selections. These actions, especially when integrated with any of
the common valuation models used for portfolio selection, may lead to better decision making
that supports both short and long-term R&D growth. We provided insight for firms to learn
what actually drive the behaviors of the managers that make portfolio decisions.
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III METHODOLOGY
III.1 Research Design
The goal of this research was to discover how portfolio decisions are shaped by the
behaviors of managers within the pharma industry during a merger. A qualitative multiple-case
study approach was used for this study since contextual conditions are important, and the
boundaries between a contemporary phenomenon in its real-world context were not clear (Yin,
2014). This approach was appropriate since this research aimed to determine what managers
say they think and how they say they feel (Bellenger, Bernhardt, & Goldstucker, 1976). The unit
of analysis is the R&D unit with various functional areas within small to large-sized firms within
pharma industry. The unit of observation is the individual managers.
Process theory was utilized since the goal was to describe and explain the temporal
sequence of events involved in the PfM decision-making process throughout a merger. An
exploratory research approach was taken to discover the relevant events that might apply in other
similar situations (Myers, 2009).
This research relies on an interpretive epistemology, since the goal was to understand
phenomena through meanings that people assign to them (Myers, 2009). We interpreted
managers’ perspectives of their behaviors that drove portfolio decisions during a merger.
III.2 Research Method
A multiple case type 3 holistic study design using literal replication was used since
similar results were predicted (Yin, 2014). Although portfolio decisions differed between firms,
the resultant actions were similar, in that managers’ behaviors shaped their portfolio decisions.
Cases were selected based on Pettigrew guidelines (Pettigrew, 1990). Additionally, managers
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were situated within the pharma industry and had encountered M&A within R&D functions. A
case study report was constructed using a linear-analytic structure consistent with (Yin, 2014).
This empirical inquiry relied on multiple sources of evidence to increase confidence in
the accuracy of the cases (Yin, 2014). Data was collected using interviews, financial reports, the
FDA website, and direct observation. Interviewees consisted of portfolio executives and
managers within R&D. In-depth semi-structured interviews were used to encourage participants
to talk freely and to describe how they make portfolio decisions during a merger (Bellenger et
al., 1976).

Stebbins (as cited by Bellenger et al., 1976) defines the in-depth interview as an

occasion for the subject to explore, clarify, and give consistency to his feelings in a way he never
has had reason to do. Due to the confidential nature of a portfolio manager’s decisions, in-depth
interviews served as the most appropriate technique for this research to allow participants to
express openly their experiences and feelings while making portfolio decisions.
Interviews were recorded using using an Olympus digital recorder (Model VN-722PC).
Transcription software was used to transcribe interviews for each case. Field notes were captured
during and after each case interaction.
A case study database was created to compile triangulated data. Interviews were
transcribed and imported into a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software that was
used to arrange the narrative and numeric data to increase the reliability of the case studies (Yin,
2014). Case site and informant identities are not revealed, as anonymity was requested by all
informants.

Case Selection. Exhibit C-1 of Appendix C outlines the criteria that were used for case
selection in this study. Managers from firms were selected based on published M&A activities
within the last 20 years. Additionally, all managers’ firms reside within the pharma industry. A
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total of eight managers from acquiring firms were chosen based on informants’ portfolio
decision making experiences during merger activities within the firm. There are a total of five
managers from the acquired firms. There are a total of three mid-sized and five large-sized
acquiring firms. There are a total of two small-sized, three mid-sized, and four large-sized
acquired firms. Table 11 details the acquiring firms’ acquisitions, including the size of both the
acquiring and acquired firm, merger time period and cost range of acquisition. All of the
acquiring firms in this study operate within the pharma space and maintain a portfolio of R&D
products. At the time of this study, all acquisitions had been completed, and post-merger
activities were underway. All acquiring firms still served as the parent company of all of its
subsidiaries and had not been acquired by a larger pharma firm. Mergers and acquisitions for
this study took place between 1995 and 2015. Acquisitions totaled approximately $180B.

Table 11 Background Data for Selected Pharmaceutical Firms
Acquirer

Acquirer Acquired
Size

Acquired
Size

Merger Year
(range)

PharmaAlphaI

Mid

ApharmaI

Small

Before 2005

Acquisition
Range
(in dollars)
<$10B

PharmaAlphaII

Mid

ApharmaII

Small

After 2005

<$10B

PharmaBeta

Mid

ApharmaIII

Mid

Before 2005

<$10B

PharmaGamma Large

ApharmaIV

Large

After 2005

>$10B

PharmaDelta

Mid

ApharmaV

Small

After 2005

<$10B

PharmaEpsilon
PharmaZeta

Large
Large

APharmaVI
ApharmaVII

Mid
Large

After 2005
Before 2005

<$10B
>$10B

Large
Large
Large

ApharmaVIII Mid
ApharmaIX
Large
ApharmaX
Large

Before 2005
After 2005
After 2005

<$10B
>$10B
>$10B

PharmaETA
PharmaTheta
PharmaIota
(Forbes.com)
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Participants. Judgmental sampling, a technique Bellenger et al. (1976) describes as the
selection of participants according to the judgment of some person knowledgeable in the area
being studied or is involved in the particular subject, was used to target recruitment for this
research. The participants for this study consisted of informants across both acquired and
acquiring pharma firms who were employed at the firm during the merger, including pre- and
post-merger activities. Additionally, informants were portfolio decision-makers for R&D
products. A total of 13 informants from pharma firms in different geographical locations were
selected for this study.

Data Collection. Three recruitment strategies were used for this study. The first strategy
entailed recruitment using the professional social media site known as LinkedIn. The recruiterlite product through LinkedIn was used to send email invitations to 45 candidates who met the
screening criteria for this study. Of the 45 screened candidates, two informants were chosen.
The second recruitment strategy involved solicitation through the researcher’s professional
network. The researcher sent the email invitation to former colleagues, co-workers, mentors, and
professors. This strategy yielded seven qualified informants. The third recruitment strategy
included snow-balling. The initial contact was made with members of the researcher’s
professional network, who then forwarded the email invitation to their respective networks.
These prospects subsequently forwarded the email invitation to their respective networks. This
recruitment effort resulted in a total of four qualified informants.
The email invitation used for this study is shown in Appendix E, Exhibit E3: Email
Invitation. This email included an invitation for pharma managers to participate in this study,
and provided a short sentence about the research goal. The subsequent paragraphs within the
invitation described the interview process, informed consent and procedures for contacting the
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researcher. Interviews were scheduled at a time convenient to both the informant and
researchers.
Data was collected from all 13 informants using semi-structured and in-depth interviews.
The interview protocol is outlined in Appendix B. When possible, interviews were conducted
face-to-face. Due to constrained physical access to some informants, four of the interviews were
face-to-face. One interview was administered by SKYPE, and eight were conducted via phone.
Interviews conducted face-to-face took place inside the informant’s office, or within a
conference room located within the firm. All interviews took place Monday through Friday
between 9:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. All Skype and telephone interviews took place in a private
conference room at Georgia State University. Conference room phones were utilized.
Interviews ranged from 37 minutes to 1 hour 31 minutes. Duration of all interviews totaled 9
hours and 53 minutes. Follow-up phone calls or emails were sent to participants to clarify
information captured during the interview.
Firm data was collected from the FDA website. Firm financial data was also collected
using financial websites such as Reuters.com and Yahoo Finance. When available, portfolio
matrices and decision-trees were reviewed. Due to the sensitivity of the data collected, these
artifacts were not allowed to be used as appendices in this study. As a result, the researcher took
mental images of the data and noted the observations within the field notes.

Interview Protocol. Each informant was asked nine questions that contained a set of subquestions to allow for free, open-ended responses. These questions were divided into three parts.
Part I focused on the demographics of the informants, as well as an organizational aspect of PfM.
Questions were asked regarding the merger impact on PfM, portfolio decision processes, and
focus on goal from a firm and individual perspective. The intent of this portion of the protocol
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was to ascertain whether or not pharma decision processes, as described by informants, align
with the literature. Further, we aimed to gain the perspective of informants as it relates to the
firm’s portfolio condition, both past and future. Part II focused on the portfolio methods adopted
by the firm, how the firm and individual deal with risks. The goal of this section was to
determine if changes occurred within the methods across the different firms after the merger.
Additionally, we aimed to determine if mergers influence informants’ decision making
processes. We also sought to assess the firm’s risk profile pre-and post-merger. Another goal
was to gain insight into how portfolio managers make difficult decisions during merger
activities. Finally, part III focused on how informants personally manage portfolios. We asked
questions that centered around individuals’ behaviors and attitudes during portfolio decision
making. The interview protocol is displayed in Appendix B, Exhibit B-1.
III.3 Data Analysis
Each interview was analyzed by listening to recorded audio files that were filed and
assigned informant number. Field notes were tabulated and organized by informant to firm
relationship to allow for content analysis. The transcribed interviews for each informant were
coded by the researcher and the researcher’s assistant to identify common themes within
informants according to descriptive coding methods. Coding was accomplished after a series of
5 steps.
First, the researcher leveraged insight from pharma industry experts for first cycle coding.
Sub-categories were used for responses that answered multiple sub-questions. Second, the
researcher applied a content analysis technique and developed a set of word or phrase categories,
based on each respondent’s responses. Third, the researcher coded each response by the coding
scheme. Fourth, the research assistant generated patterns to use for the second coding cycle. All
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three parts of the interview protocol were categorized, and themes were identified. Lastly, the
researchers collaborated on the determination of common themes until full agreement was
reached.
The researchers achieved inter-rater reliability by reaching 95 percent agreement after
first cycle coding and 99 percent agreement after second cycle coding. Cohen’s Kappa
Coefficient was 0.75, which denotes adequate agreement (Randolph, 2008).
Within-case analysis was used to identify how common narratives from different
managers within pharma firms shape portfolio decisions during merger activities. A cross-case
analysis was conducted to identify differences in informants’ narratives from the acquiring
versus the acquired pharma firms. A chain of evidence was created to allow others to follow the
derivation of any evidence from initial research questions to case study conclusions.
Content analysis is defined by Berelson (as cited by Bellenger et al., 1976) as a technique
for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of
communications. This technique was utilized to glean important responses from the interviews
(Bellenger et al., 1976). The researchers followed the 7 steps for conducting content analysis, as
suggested by Bellenger et al. (1976), which include: (1) specify needed data, (2) map out plans
for tabulation, (3) lay out the skeleton of the outline, (4) fill in categories for each variable, (5)
establish procedure for unitizing the material, (6) try out the analysis outline and unitizing
procedure, and (7) use the analysis outline and interpret the results. Microsoft EXCEL and QSR
International Pty Ltd.’s NVIVO Version 10, 2012 for Windows was the tool used to facilitate
content analysis for this study.
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IV RESULTS
In this study, all informants are represented as managers. Each manager and their respective
firms have been given a pseudo name to maintain anonymity as requested by the informants.
Managers are identified as “Informant,” followed by a numeral. Acquiring firms will be identified
as “Pharma,” followed by a Greek numeral.

Acquired firms will be identified as “APharma,”

followed by a roman numeral. Merger activities for this study include decisions made before,
during and after M&A.

IV.1 Demographics
Managers for this study are categorized into two groups. Group one is composed of eight
managers from acquiring firms. Group two consists of five managers from acquired firms. Other
demographics include gender, race, education level, years with firm, and functional area of firm.
Of the 13 managers, three are female and ten are male. Concerning race, all managers are
Caucasian, with the exception one African-American manager. All of the managers have college
degrees. Eight managers have doctoral degrees. Three managers have master’s degrees, and two
have bachelor’s degrees. Four managers are or have been employed with the firm for greater than
ten years. The remaining nine managers are, or have been employed with the firm for less than
ten years. Eleven managers were employed at the executive-level. One manager was employed
at the middle-management level. One manager was employed as a consultant.
During merger activities, managers worked within R&D across different functional areas.
Two managers operated as c-suite executives. Seven managers worked directly within the PfM
unit. One manager worked within legal, one within strategy and one within operations. Table 12
provides a breakdown of the managers’ demographics grouped by the acquiring and acquired
firms.
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Table 12 Participant Demographics
Managers - Acquiring Firms
Identity

Department

Gender Firm

Ethnicity

Education
Level

PharmaAlphaI

Years
with
Firm
>10

Informant1

Legal

Male

Caucasian

Doctorate

Informant2

Portfolio
Management

Female

PharmaAlphaII

<10

Caucasian

Doctorate

Informant3

R&D

Female

PharmaAlphaII

<10

AfricanAmerican

Bachelors

Informant4

Marketing

Female

PharmaAlphaII

<10

Caucasian

Masters

Informant8

Portfolio
Management

Male

PharmaDelta

<10

Caucasian

Doctorate

Informant10

C-Suite

Male

PharmaZeta

<10

Caucasian

Doctorate

Informant11

Strategy

Male

PharmaEta

<10

Caucasian

Doctorate

Informant13

Operations

Male

PharmaIota

>10

Caucasian

Doctorate

Managers - Acquired Firms
Informant5

C-Suite

Male

APharmaIII

<10

Caucasian

Masters

Informant6

Portfolio
Management

Male

APharmaIV

>10

Caucasian

Masters

Informant7

Portfolio
Management
R&D

Male

APharmaIV

<10

Caucasian

Doctorate

Male

APharmaVI

<10

Caucasian

Doctorate

Portfolio
Management

Male

APharmaIX

>10

Caucasian

Bachelors

Informant9
Informant12

Tables 13 and 14 show the manager to firm relationships for this study. Table 13
represents managers from acquiring firms. Table 14 represents managers from the acquired firm.
There are a total of 10 different mergers that are represented in this study. Two acquiring firms,
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PharmaTheta and PharmaEpsilon, are represented in this study. However, these two firms are
not listed in Table 13 because there are no managers in this study from the acquiring firms.
There are three managers who were employed by firms acquired by the same firm, which we
refer to as PharmaGamma and PharmaTheta, which represents two separate mergers. There was
one manager employed by a firm acquired by PharmaEpsilon. PharmaAlpha will be referred to
as PharmaAlphaI and PharmaAlphaII, which represents one firm with to separate mergers.

Table 13 Managers from Acquiring Firm
Manager
Informant1

Acquiring Firm
PharmaAlphaI

Informant2

PharmaAlphaII

Informant3

PharmaAlphaII

Informant4

PharmaAlphaII

Informant8

PharmaDelta

Informant10

PharmaZeta

Informant11

PharmaEta

Informant13

PharmaIota

Table 14 Managers from Acquired Firm
Manager

Acquired Firm

Informant5

APharmaIII

Informant6

APharmaIV

Informant7

APharmaIV

Informant9

APharmaVI

Informant12

APharmaIX
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IV.2 Organizational Context and Processes
Mergers are known to complicate PfM within any industry. Within pharma, mergers
happen almost yearly in effort to promote growth in one or many areas. For this study, we asked
managers: “What do you think led to the merger that has taken place within your firm?” Figure
6 displays the three categories that were derived from the analysis. The three main merger goals
as described by managers were to (a) gain a new footprint, (b) enter into a new therapeutic, and
(c) strengthen the pipeline.

Goal of Merger

New Footprint. One of the common goals of the merger was to obtain a new footprint.
This goal was stated for five of the 10 firms. These firms include: PharmaAlphaI, APharmaI,
PharmaBeta, PharmaZeta, PharmaETA, and PharmaGamma. For this study, a new footprint
involved the acquisition of new divisions outside of the core competencies of the firm, such as
consumers or medical devices. The expansion of capabilities and opportunities to become the
brand leader were also goals of the mergers.
New Therapeutic Area. Another goal was to obtain a new therapeutic area. Two of the
10 firms focused on this goal. These firms include PharmaDelta and PharmaEpsilon. In both
cases, the firms sought entry into new markets outside of its existing capabilities. The goal of
both firms was to obtain a presence in these new areas to expand market share.
Strengthen Pipeline. Three of the 10 firms commissioned to strengthen its pipeline
through acquisitions. A strengthened pipeline indicates more viable and promising drugs will be
launched. These firms include PharmaGamma, PharmaAlpha, and PharmaIota. These three
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firms acquired competitors whose products were stronger and more robust. In all three of these
cases, the acquiring firms were experiencing a weakened pipeline before the mergers.
Overall Goal of Merger. All three of the above-mentioned goals seek so expand
capabilities and grow pipelines. Figure 7 shows the three merger goals by firm. Table 15 shows
the categories and subcategories of the firms’ goals. For each of the mergers, having the
capacity to develop, launch and sell more products was a common goal. There did not appear to
be any differences in firm goals as it relates to firm size or acquisition amount.

New Footprint
•
•
•
•
•

PharmaAlphaI
PharmaBeta
PharmaZeta
PharmaETA
PharmaTheta

New Therapeutic Area

• PharmaDelta
• PharmaEpsilon
Strengthen Pipeline
•PharmaGamma
•PharmaAlphaII
•PharmaIota
Figure 7 Goal of Merger – Firm Level
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All of the managers had a clear understanding of their firms’ goals for the merger. In each
response, managers were able to communicate a clear strategy for the merger. The goal to
establish more products align with the findings from the literature that states growth expectations
of pharma M&A.

Table 15 Goal of Merger – Theme
Merger Goal
Subcategory

New Footprint

Theme

Expansion
More Drugs

New Therapeutic Area

Strengthen Pipeline

Pipeline Growth

Portfolio Condition. After discovering the goal to launch more products, we sought to
understand the condition of the firm’s portfolio through managers’ lenses. Our first attempt to
explore the narrative thought of managers was to inquire about their perspective of the firm’s
portfolio condition before the merger. We asked: “What do you think will happen to the portfolio
in the future?” Table 16 summarizes managers’ perspectives on the condition of their firm’s
portfolio before the merger and their forecasts of the firm’s future portfolio.
Nine of 13 managers forecasted future growth for their firm’s portfolio. Of the nine
managers who forecasted future growth, five were from acquiring firms, and four were from
acquired firms. Two of 13 managers forecasted a decline in their firm’s portfolio. Of the two

53
managers, one was from an acquiring firm and one was from an acquired firm. One manager was
uncertain about their acquired firm’s future portfolio condition.

Table 16 Portfolio Condition of Firm
Acquiring Firm Managers’ Perspectives of Portfolio Condition
Manager

Firm

Informant1

PharmaAlphaI

Informant8

PharmaDelta

Pre-Merger

Future Forecast

Strong

Growth

Informant11

PharmaETA

Informant10

PharmaZeta

Informant3

PharmaAlpha

Moderate

Informant2

PharmaAlphaII

Strong

Informant13

PharmaIota

Strong

Informant4

PharmaAlphaII

Weak

Decline

Uncertainty

Acquired Firm Managers’ Perspectives of Portfolio Condition
Informant5

APharmaIII

Informant6

APharmaIV

Informant9

APharmaVI

Informant12

APharmaIX

Informant7

APharmaIV

Weak

Growth

Strong

Growth

Moderate

Decline
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Nine of 13 managers viewed the pre-merger condition of their firm’s portfolio as strong.
Of the nine managers who viewed their firm’s portfolio as strong before the merger, six were from
acquiring firms, and three were from acquired firms. Two of 13 managers viewed their firm’s premerger portfolio condition as moderate. Of the two managers who viewed their firm’s portfolio
condition before the merger as moderate, one was from an acquired firm and one was from an
acquiring firm. Two of 13 managers viewed their firm’s pre-merger portfolio condition as weak.
Of the two managers who viewed their firm’s portfolio condition before the merger as weak, one
was from an acquired firm and one was from an acquiring firm.
Informant5 of APharmaIII was the only manager from an acquired firm who viewed the
firm’s pre-merger portfolio condition as weak. Informant5 explained:
“We’re seeing the same thing we’ve seen in so many other areas in pharma kind
of repeating today, Catrina. The pipeline yield went way down. After years of
spending hundreds of hundreds of millions of dollars on R&D, only one product
had come out. For a number of years, nothing else came out.”
Informant5 forecasted that the firm’s portfolio would grow post-merger.
Informant13 viewed his acquiring firm’s pre-merger condition as strong. However,
Informant13 was uncertain about the firm’s future growth. Informant13 expressed concern for the
possibility of drug terminations and divestments, as well as for the firm placing too much emphasis
on blockbuster products. Informant13’s comments suggest that the merger would result in fewer
drugs based on his past experiences. When asked about the future condition of the portfolio,
Informant13 stated:
“I think it will be for sure some cuts specifically on the smaller projects which
are not historically from PharmaIota, according to the past. There is a lot of
stuff which have already proven or sold to someone else, but I think this kind of
concentration on the big product will go on. They are reviewing the portfolio
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carefully on regular basis so I think there would be further concentration on the
big programs with smaller ones being sold.”
Informant4 viewed her acquiring firm’s portfolio as weak pre-merger and also expressed
uncertainty for the firm’s future portfolio. Informant4’s uncertainty in the firm’s future portfolio
stemmed from her past experiences with downsizing and a reduction in the sales force.
Informant4 believed that the funding for future development could positively impact the future
portfolio of a firm. A new theme, “product promotion”, was identified while coding
Informant4’s responses. When a follow-up question was asked: “Do you think the pipeline
would sustain the firm’s future if funding is provided for future development?” Informant4
responded with:
“I certainly hope so. I guess it depends on how successful we were in promoting
them. That’s a deep question.”

During the face-to-face interview, Informant4 paused for a great length of time before answering
this question.
Informant2 (of an acquiring firm) and Informant7 (of an acquired firm), were the only
two managers who forecasted a decline in their firm’s future portfolio. Informant7 provided the
following explanation for his prediction:
“Often it depends on what decisions they make. When they make those portfolio
decisions when they merge, they don’t keep the pipeline of both companies. They
whittle them down to a smaller number because it’s not just additive.”

Informant7 emphasized the importance of decisions and its impact on the post-merger pipeline.
Informant7 suggested that selecting the wrong products during merger activities could negatively
impact a firm’s portfolio. Informant2 forecasted a weakened pipeline due to the weaker pipeline
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of the acquired firm. Informant2’s forecast of a declining portfolio centers on her belief that
R&D expenditures would decrease. This is supported by Informant2’s response to her view of
her firm’s future portfolio:
“I’d like to think that PharmaAlphaII is going to continue to feel [therapeutic
area] is an important place to be, and that there are not as many companies
committed to [therapeutic area], so there’s opportunity there but it will take a
lot of investment, and that’s the big question. I honestly don’t know if the
company will invest beyond the areas they’re in right now.”
Informant2 and Informant7 had differing perspectives as to why their firms would experience a
decline in its future portfolio. Their respective responses do not suggest that gender or level of
education influenced the different perspectives.
All three of the female managers at PharmaAlphaII had different views of their firm’s
current and future portfolio condition. Informant2, Informant3, and Informant4s’ views of the
portfolio during the merger were strong, moderate and weak, respectively. Informant2
forecasted that the firm’s future portfolio would decline. Informant3 forecasted that the firm’s
future portfolio would grow. Informant4 was uncertain about the firm’s future portfolio
condition. All 3 of the managers operated within different functional areas of the firm during
merger activities. Refer to Table 17 to view managers’ perspectives.
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Table 17 Portfolio Condition Within Firm Analysis – PharmaAlphaII
Acquiring Firm Managers’ Perspectives of Portfolio Condition
Manager
Firm
During
Future Forecast
Merger
(Post-merger)
Informant2
PharmaAlphaII
Strong
Decline
Informant3
PharmaAlphaII
Moderate
Growth
Informant4

PharmaAlphaII

Weak

Uncertainty

Two male managers from the PharmaGamma and ApharmaIV merger had differing views
of the firm’s current and future portfolio condition. Informant7 viewed the current condition of
the firm’s portfolio as moderate. Informant6 viewed the current condition of their firm’s portfolio
as strong. Informant7 forecasted a decline for the merged firm’s (PharmaGamma) future portfolio.
Informant6 forecasted growth for the merged firm’s (PharmaGamma) future portfolio. Both these
managers operated within different functional areas for their respective firms during merger
activities. The responses from both managers do not suggest that education level influenced their
perspectives. Table 18 displays the responses of these two managers.

Table 18 Portfolio Condition Within Firm Analysis - PharmaGamma
Acquired Firm Manager’s Perspectives of Portfolio Condition
Manager
Firm
During
Merged Firm
Future Forecast
Merger
(Post-merger)
Informant7
APharmaIV
Moderate
PharmaGamma
Decline
Informant6
APharmaIV
Strong
PharmaGamma
Growth
Overall, nine of the 13 managers forecasted future growth for their firm’s portfolio postmerger. A common theme among all nine managers is the belief that the firm would experience
growth as a result of inheriting more drug products through M&A. Informant3 attributed
PharmaAlphaII’s post-merger growth forecast growth to a robust R&D pipeline. This is
supported by her response:
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“I think it will grow bigger. They have a lot of great products in store that are
yet to come, a lot of applications that are in R&D.”

We asked Informant3 if she felt that the growth was a result of the merger, her response was:

“I think so, yeah. I think it's a result of the mergers, a result of the change in
leadership and the business model of the company. I think that has a lot to do
with the direction that the company is going.”

Informant3’s response suggests that she attributes her firm’s growth potential to new leadership
and a new business model. Informant11 attributed PharmaETA’s future growth to anticipated
acquisitions. He stated:
“I think their portfolio is going to continue to be strong. They'll buy whatever
they need to buy to continue that way.”
Informant5 introduced the role of luck in future portfolio growth. He states:
“I feel good about the portfolio; I feel very good about the level of science that's
been advised. The reality of it is in our space, we are all subjects to a bit of luck
with the right science at the right time, with the right team doing the development
work.”
A common theme of the two managers who forecasted a decline in the firm’s portfolio is the
belief that viable overlapping drugs would be eliminated as a result of M&A and R&D
expenditures would decrease. Figure 8 shows the common themes represented by all 13
managers. A common theme amongst growth forecasts includes (a) good leadership, (b) good
(c) business model, (d) planned expansion, (e) good market differentiation, (f) and luck – the
right science at the right time.
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Figure 8 Common Themes Attributing to Future Portfolio Condition
Archived data was obtained to measure managers’ forecasts against actual performance
of the firm today. Appendix F, Exhibit F-1 shows the firm’s revenue range pre- and postmerger, and whether or not the firm experienced growth or decline after the merger. Figure 9
shows the firm performance after the merger. Only half of the firms experienced post-merger
growth.
It is important to mention the context of the informants’ perspectives regarding the firm’s
future portfolio condition. Most managers forecasted portfolio growth as a result of having more
drugs from the acquired and acquiring firms’ combined portfolios post-merger. Portfolio growth
in this context is the aggregate of the portfolios from Firm A (acquiring) and Firm B (acquired).
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We do not believe informants considered the merged firm’s resultant portfolio condition when
responding to this question. The resultant portfolio consists of drugs selected after terminating
or divesting drugs that overlap or do not align with the firm’s strategy. The resultant portfolio is
what gets R&D funding for further development and launch. We did not capture informant
perspectives on the resultant portfolio, but rather the condition of the future portfolio prior to
actual performance. This gap is worthy of further investigation in future research.
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Figure 9 Post-Merger Performance

Portfolio Processes
Governance. To explore how managers actually make decisions during a merger, we
sought to gain insight into pre- and post-merger changes in the portfolio processes. We asked
managers: “How are portfolio decisions governed within your firm? How were these decisions
governed before the merger?” All managers indicated that although they were responsible for
making portfolio decisions, a governance board made the final decision. The governance board
activities were the same before the merger across all firms. In addition to selecting and
approving the final portfolio, managers reported that the governance board approves M&A
transactions. In this study, managers provided similar responses to the composition of the
governance board. Figure 10 shows the complexion of governance boards across all ten firms.
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Similarly, these governance boards consisted of Investors (private or shareholders),
Consultants, Medical Affairs, Board of Directors from the parent company, Executive
Committee and Cross-Functional teams. Cross-functional teams included common departments,
such as Clinical, Finance, Safety, Human Resources, Legal, Marketing, Quality, Regulatory,
R&D, Supply Chain, and Product Development. In this study, senior managers or department
heads from cross-functional teams served on the governance board. Most of these senior
managers resided at the firms’ headquarters.
Informant5 noted that the governance board at PharmaBeta was composed of mostly
men. No other manager made this gender distinction for their respective firms.

CrossFunctional
Teams

Medical
Affairs

Executive
Committee

Consultants

Clinical, Finance, Safety,
Human Resources, Legal,
Marketing, Quality,
Regulatory, R&D, Supply
Chain, Product
Development

Investors

Board of
Directors

Parent Company

Figure 10 Governance Board Composition of Firms
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IV.3 Portfolio Valuation and Selection
Portfolio Decision-Making Process. After understanding the composition of governance
boards and how they operate within pharma firms, managers were asked: “Can you describe how
portfolio decision-making processes within firm X work?” We followed the question with:
“How did the process work before the merger?” It was discovered that decision-making
processes at pharma firms occur iteratively throughout merger activities. Also, these processes
are not sequential. For this reason, we have depicted these processes as events A through D that
could occur at any interval during merger activities. The top four commonly used processes
were to (a) apply financial models, (b) conduct portfolio reviews, (c) assess market impact, and
(d) prioritize the portfolio.
Six firms applied financial modeling during the decision-making process. All firms that
utilized this model did not change the process post-merger. Figure 11 shows the categories and
subcategories of the various financial methods used by these firms. Firms looked at financial
forecasts and development costs when making portfolio decisions.
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Category

Apply Financial
Models

Subcategory

Firm

Look at
Forecasts

PharmaIota

Determine Cost
of Development

PharmaGamma

Attractiveness
of Financials

PharmaETA

Forecast growth

PharmaDelta

APharmaVI
Look at
financials
APharmaVII

Figure 11 Pre- and Post-Merger Process Event A
Five firms conducted portfolio reviews at varying intervals throughout the year. During these
reviews, managers presented their drug evaluations and recommendations to the governance
board for final decision making. Figure 12 shows firms that utilized some form portfolio review
methods during portfolio decision making. All firms that conducted portfolio reviews did not
change this process post-merger.
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Category

Conduct
Portfolio
Reviews

Subcategory

Firm

Review Portfolio
with Senior
Management

PharmaDelta

Review Portfolio
Weekly

PharmaIota

Conduct Periodic
Review

PharmaGamma

APharmaVI
Conduct StageGates
APharmaVII

Figure 12 Pre- and Post-Merger Process Event B
Two firms assessed market impacts while making portfolio decisions. One of the firms,
PharmaAlphaII, changed its post-merger decision-making process. None of the informants from
PharmaAlphaII identified market impact as a component to decision making, as they had premerger. Figure 13 shows the firms who assessed market impact while making portfolio
decisions during merger activities.
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Category

Assess Market
Impact

Subcategory

Firm

Decisions based
upon market
impact

PharmaAlphaII

Identify market
impact

PharmaETA

Figure 13 Pre- and Post-Merger Process Event C
Five firms prioritized its portfolio when making portfolio decisions. All firms that ranked and
prioritized its portfolio did not change the processes post-merger. Figure 14 shows firms that
prioritized the portfolio to select the most attractive drugs and introduce emerging drugs during
merger activities.
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Category

Prioritize
Portfolio

Subcategory

Firm

Select Most
Attractive
Drug(s)

PharmaGamma

Identify 2-3
Drugs

PharmaDelta

Select and
Assess Portfolio

PharmaETA

APharmaVI
Introduce
Product Concept
APharmaVII

Figure 14 Pre- and Post-Merger Process Event D

Changes in DM Processes. The decision-making process did not change for seven of the
firms after the merger. Of the seven firms with no change in the decision-making process, five
were acquiring and two were acquired firms. The decision-making process did change after the
merger for three firms. Of the three firms, one was an acquirer and the other was acquired. Table
19 shows a break-down of the firms that showed changes, as well as no changes in the decisionmaking process during merger activities.
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Table 19 Change in Decision-Making Process by Firm
Firm
No Change in Process

Change in Process

Acquiring Firms

PharmaAlphaI
PharmaDelta
PharmaETA
PharmaIota
PharmaGamma

PharmaAlphaII

Acquired Firms

APharmaVI
APharmaVII

APharmaIII
APharmaIX

Pre-Merger Process Changes. Two of the three firms’ processes that changed postmerger had pre-merger processes that were unstructured and carried out in silos. These two firms
were PharmaAlphaII and APharmaIII. PharmaAlphaII and ApharmaIII’s pre-merger decisionmaking process involved ad-hoc decision making with no buy-in from other teams.
PharmaAlphaII’s decision making before the merger was investor driven with no clearly defined
decision-making processes. Informant3’s perspective of PharmaAlphaII’s pre-merger decisionmaking process as follows:
“To be honest with you, there wasn't really a clear cut process for the steps to
go through, like first you contact this person then that person. I think over time
based on trial and error and doing some of these we've formulated a process.”
APharmaIII’s pre-merger decision-making process was also informal. Further, its pre-merger
processes were political and inward looking. Informant5 described APharmaIII’s pre-merger
decision-making process as:
“It was a group of guys who got together and would come in and say yeah we
like this program, no we don't really like this one. It was ad-hoc and informal.
It didn't have input from stakeholders throughout the organization. I'm sure
there was more data that flowed into it than we saw. I wasn't on that executive
team of [small number]. I was that very next level in the organization reporting
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to that group. For a number of years until the leadership really settled back out
at APharmaIII, it was an effort to use the data, but often seemed in support a
pre-existing preference for the child of the clinical development programs or
R&D programs from the company that you originated. That portfolio process
became highly politicized of people from legacy PharmaBeta wanting to keep
the PharmaBeta programs alive. Either because they believed in them or
because they knew them. As I mentioned they're kind of their children or
because they want to make sure that [site] stayed open.”
Pre-merger processes appeared to consist of smaller teams of executives and investors who made
critical decisions with little to no buy-in from managers who have the most knowledge about the
drug and its growth potential.

Post-Merger Process Changes. PharmaAlphaII and PharmaBeta showed significant
changes in the decision-making process post-merger. PharmaAlphaII underwent a process
improvement initiative post-merger that aligned with more common decision-making processes
described by the other firms. PharmaAlphaII and PharmaBeta applied financial models and
conducted portfolio reviews as a result of the merger.
Informant5 elaborated on why decision-making processes improved significantly at
APharmaIII. Informant5 stated:
“I really think the recent progress and the recent refocusing that we've seen in
the last [X] years has truly built shareholder value at APharmaIII. That didn't
come about until the last exit of the old people. They kind of moved out, and all
of the politics and personal ownership was put to bed. True professional
[industry] leadership has a real strong history of the ability to assess programs.
The lifeblood of all these companies, the future value of all these companies is
really all about the decisions that are made during the portfolio management
process. To do it in any way that allows those distractions- We're all human and
we all bring that. You have to recognize that. To not make the effort to
professionalize and really work through what assets the company has and the
value of each of them, lines up against the skills sets of the organization and
make those hard choices on where you’re going to focus and invest hours.”
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Post-merger processes seemed to work best when the leadership changed and politics were
lessened. All of the managers emphasized the value of making good decisions for the portfolio
so that long-term growth can be realized.
Emerging Theme. A theme emerged as managers described pre- and post-merger
decision-making processes within their respective firms. Informant5 introduced the role of
culture and its impact on his firm’s pre-merger decision-making process:
“APharmaIII pre-merger, when I sort of realized the company grew out of a
single drug that was unexpectedly successful in the treatment of [disease].
Really only looked there because of the vision of one physician. Didn't really
work for the company, one external [doctor] who basically strong-armed the
company into doing work. The first and only product the company launched was
wildly successful. You had an organization where people had grown up and
thought that was normal and didn't understand that most companies fail a lot
more before they have that big hit, and have a lot of small hits before they have
that big hit and have that balanced view. APharmaIII was a very inward- looking
culture.”
Culture appeared to have an impact on how managers make portfolio decisions. Many firms
don’t seek out long-term R&D developments and the profits from short-term wins fall short of
sustaining long-term growth.

Decision-Making Methods. Governance, decision-making processes, and methods are
all included within the PfM process. We asked managers: “What kinds of methods are being
used within firm X for making portfolio decisions?” We followed the question with: “Were these
methods used before the merger?” Table 20 shows the firm whose methods changed or did not
change during merger activities. Table 21 displays the different methods used across firm during
decision-making processes.
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Table 20 Change in Decision-Making Methods by Firm
Firm
No Change
Change
Acquiring Firms

PharmaAlphaI
PharmaDelta
PharmaZeta
PharmaETA
PharmaIota

PharmaAlphaII

Acquired Firms

APharmaIV
APharmaVI

APharmaIX
APharmaIII

The majority of firms (seven) showed no change in methods during merger activities. Three
firms showed changes in methods post-merger.

Common Methods. Six firms used financial methods, such as ROI, NPV, and payback
period when making portfolio decisions during merger activities. Managers across four firms
relied on intuition as a method to aid them in decision making. Qualitative assessments were
used by managers from three firms. Evidence-based decision making methods were used by
managers from two firms.

Pre- and Post-Merger Methods. One or more of the common methods mentioned in the
above section was used during merger activities across all firms. Most of the methods were used
in both pre- and post-merger settings. Other methods presented within the literature were also
used independently across firms. These methods included expert analysis and weighted scoring.
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Table 21 Methods Used Across Firms
Category
Subcategory

Financial Models

Intuition

Qualitative
Assessments

Evidence-Based

Firm

NPV
ROI
NPV
Sales Forecasts
Payback Period
Forecasts
Internal Thought of
Leaders

PharmaAlphaI
PharmaAlphaII
PharmaGamma
PharmaDelta
APharmaIX
PharmaIota
PharmaDelta
PharmaEpsilon
PharmaZeta
PharmaETA

Due Diligence
Case-by-Case Analysis
Evaluation Models
Decision-tree

PharmaAlphaII
PharmaDelta
PharmaETA

Market Data
Clinical Trial Data
Historical Data

PharmaAlphaII
PharmaETA

Effectiveness of Methods. After we confirmed that methods mentioned in the literature
are being used by managers in this study, we asked managers: “Do you feel these methods are
effective?” Table 22 show the responses from managers across various firms. Nine of the 13
managers stated that their firms’ methods were effective. Three managers form acquiring and
acquired firms felt their firms’ methods were ineffective. One manager stated that their firm’s
methods are sometimes effective.
Managers who reported method effectiveness shared three common themes: use of (a)
evidence-based methodology, (b) transparency, and (c) cross-functional buy-in. Managers who
reported ineffectiveness shared one common theme: Failure to effectively integrate. Lack of
transparency and not obtaining buy-in were other reasons for method ineffectiveness. Other
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reasons provided by managers to explain method ineffectiveness were ineffective decision
making, troubled pipeline, and merger complexity.

Ineffective Methods. Informant5 provided an explanation for the ineffectiveness of
methods at his firm. He stated:
“It was just two vastly very different cultures. The attempt to juggle them without
forcing the organization to become a single combined entity led to an extended
period of failure to integrate. This led to, in my view, an extended failure to make
tough decisions rapidly because you had to play the political game of is this
decision a detriment of one of the two sides. How can I recruit enough strength
from this other side in order to prevail? That affected even the portfolio
management processes because you had so much personal ownership of the
programs, that you were trying to prioritize in the portfolio.”
The failure to integrate was the primary cause of ineffective methods within firms.

Overall Changes. Our findings show that most of the methods and processes did not
change post-merger, but half of the firms in the study experienced a decline in financial
performance post-merger. Since most processes and methods remained the same post-merger,
they must have been applied in a more rigorous manner. We posit that the merged firm’s
leadership (CEO, Governance Board) focused more on late-stage development, and terminated
early stage developments that could have potentially resulted in long-term growth.
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Table 22 Decision-Making Method Effectiveness
Acquiring Firms
Firm
PharmaAlphaI

Manager
Informant1

PharmaAlphaII

Informant2

PharmaAlphaII

Informant3

PharmaAlphaII
PharmaDelta

Informant4
Informant8

PharmaZeta

Informant10

PharmaETA
PharmaIota

Informant11
Informant 13

APharmaIII

Informant5

APharmaIV

Informant8

APharmaIV
APharmaVI
ApharmaIX

Informant7
Informant9
Informant12

Reason
Uniform procedure
Effective communication
Early Buy-in
Disciplined
Non-biased
Buy-in
Collaboration
Evidence-based
Transparency
Accurate Forecasts
Honesty
Cross-functional buy-in
Intuition
Ineffective merger strategy
Ineffective decision making
Use of metrics
Diversified decision making
Acquired Firms

Effectiveness
Effective

Lack of transparency
Failure to integrate
No buy-in
Merger complexity
Evidence-based
validation post-decision
Troubled pipeline
Risk-based decision making
Thoroughness

Ineffective

Effective
Effective

Effective
Effective

Ineffective
Effective
Effective

Effective
Ineffective
Sometimes
Effective

Firm Goals. After gaining insight into firms’ processes and methods, we delve into the
goals of the firm. Managers were asked: “Have the goals of the firm changed since the merger?”
If so, how? All of the managers stated that goals of their respective firms changed after the merger
(refer to Table 23). All managers from the firms provided various reasons for the change in goals.
PharmaIota and PharmaAlpha goals became more patient focused.

PharmaGamma,
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PharmaEpsilon, PharmaEta, and PharmaDelta focused on expansion. PharmaBeta became more
R&D driven. PharmaZeta changed its strategy.

Table 23 Change in Firm Goals
Firm
Did firm’s goal
change after the
merger?
PharmaAlphaI
Yes
PharmaAlphaII

Yes

PharmaDelta

Yes

PharmaZeta

Yes

PharmaETA

Yes

PharmaIota

Yes

APharmaIII

Yes

APharmaIV

Yes

APharamIX

Yes

APharmaVI

Yes

We gained further insight into firms’ goals by asking managers: “Are the firm’s goal long
or short-term focused? We followed with: “Has this focus changed since the merger?” We then
asked managers: “Do you feel your firm’s goals are attainable?” Table 24 shows the varied
responses across all firms.
PharmaTheta was the only firm to change its focus (after its merger with APharmaIX). Its
focus changed from long- to short-term. Informant12 elaborated that APharmaIX’s pre-merger
short-term focus was due to the year-over-year sales goals. ApharmaIX was long-term focused
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post-merger because they had a new strategic vision. The focus of all of the other firms did not
change after the merger.

Pre-Merger Goal Focus and Attainment. Eight managers viewed their firm’s focus as
long-term, with a heavy emphasis on R&D. Informant8’s response aligned with all of the eight
managers’ perspectives supporting long-term focus:
“I think it's a near term which is squarely focused on getting this product
approved. I think, yeah, going back to my earlier point, we still have very much
of a long term play because this is one milestone. Potential approval is one
milestone, but we're still very much focused on building and driving R&D
internally. That requires much more longer-term thinking and planning this is a
shorter-term focus. I think in that respect, our goals have always remained, and
still remain more long term in terms of developing longer-term consistent value
to our shareholders.”

Four managers viewed their firm’s focus as short-term. One manager viewed their firm as both
long and short-term focused.
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Table 24 Firm Focus Pre- and Post-Merger
Managers’ Perspectives - Acquiring Firms
Informant
Firm
Pre-Merger
Post-Merger
Focus
Focus
Informant1
PharmaAlphaI
Informant3
PharmaAlphaII
Long
Informant8
PharmaDelta
Informant11
PharmaETA
No Change
Informant13
PharmaIota
Informant2
PharmaAlpha2

Attainable
Goals?

Yes

Uncertain
Informant10
Informant4

Short
PharmaZeta
PharmaAlpha2
Managers’ Perspectives - Acquired Firms

Informant5
Informant6
Informant7

APharmaII
APharmaIV
APharmaIV

Long
Both
Short

Same

Yes

Informant9
Informant12

APharmaVI
APharmaIX

Long
Long

Same
Short

Uncertain
No

Yes

Informant6 explained why APharmaIV’s focus was both long and short-term focused:
“I would say 60:40, 60 being short term. When I say short-term, like two years
to three years. Long term is like is three and above. It would be more executing
smaller tactical projects to gain momentum, increasing net sales and increasing
distribution as certain short-term goals. In addition, any quick wins in terms of
reducing overhead, reducing destruction of products, managing cost, would
have been more of those efficiency type projects were the short term. The same
type of projects was long term as well. Sometimes a new product with new
technology or new products that had to be reached in a brand new country would
take long time. Just two new products and efficiency projects were implemented,
but the time or duration to implement those in certain markets or certain type of
products took longer time, so it became long term objectives.”
Nine of the managers felt their firms’ goals were attainable. Three managers expressed
uncertainty regarding goal attainment. The common theme amongst these three managers was a
lack of R&D/innovation. Only one manager felt their firm’s goals were unattainable due to the
unrealistic component of the goal. Informant12 simply stated:
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“I feel like they are way too far out of reach. They're incredibly optimistic, and
it just isn't realistic at all that we can achieve those financial goals.”
We’ve learned that merged firms had a different goal structure post-merger. The new
goals focused more on ROI. When a firm is more focused on financial goals, R&D expenditures
get cut as a cost-saving measure. We posit that the lack of R&D funding contributes to postmerger portfolio shrinkage.
Firms’ Risk Profiles. Firms have a propensity for dealing with risks differently. A firm
is considered to be risk averse if it seeks to reduce uncertainty when faced with it. We asked
managers: “Is your firm more risk averse post-merger as it was pre-merger?” Table 25 shows a
summary of manager responses and their respective firm’s risk profile.
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Table 25 Risk Profile Post-Merger
Acquiring Firms
Summary of Managers’ Perspectives
The Board of Directors and Investors are far more risk
averse.
Doing more risk management since the merger. Risk
management is now applied to every brand.

Risk Averse

PharmaAlphaII

More risk conscious. Firm looks for mitigation strategies.

More

PharmaDelta

Merger made firm think very carefully about portfolio
decision making. Changed risk taking approach after the
merger.

PharmaZeta

In general, as firms become larger, they become more and
more risk-averse.

PharmaAlphaII

Taking more risks and changed how they look at R&D.

PharmaAlphaII

The pharma division was growing but there wasn’t a lot of Less
activity there in terms of dynamic growth through
acquisition. Firm rapidly acquired two more firms.

PharmaETA

-

Firm
PharmaAlphaI
PharmaIota

No Change
Acquired Firms

APharamaIII

Firm wanted to win and wanted to take more risks but was Less
afraid of failure. Firm was forced to take more clinical and
regulatory risks.

APharmaIX

The firm bases a lot of the decisions on numbers and
valuations but it also doesn't allow any mistakes. Firm
isn’t very supportive of risks.

APharmaIV

-

APharmaIV
APharmaVI

Small acquisition. Merger didn't make a difference.

More

No Change

Ten of the 13 managers stated that their firm’s risk tolerance changed after the merger.
Seven managers indicated their firm was more risk averse after the merger. Three managers
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reported that their firm was less risk averse post-merger. Three managers said their firms did not
change its risk profile after the merger.
Firms that became more risk averse post-merger engaged in more risk management
activities, especially within R&D. Managers of firms that became less risk averse post-merger
all stated that their firms were willing to take more risks in exchange for growth opportunities.
There were no differences in risk aversion between acquired and acquiring firms. There
were differences in the responses within the same firms. One of the three PharmaAlphaII
managers viewed their firm as more risk averse post-merger, as opposed to the other two
managers who felt their firm was less risk averse. The two managers with the same risk aversion
perspective provided different justifications for their perspectives. Likewise, the two managers
from the PharmaGamma/APharmaIV merger had varying perspectives of their firm’s risk
aversion. One manager felt the firm was more risk averse, while the other felt there was no
change in the way it faced risks post-merger. The majority of managers, who were from either
the acquired or acquiring firms that were large, stated that the firm had become more risk averse
post-merger.
If firms become more risk averse post-merger, they are less likely to take risks on R&D
drugs that may need further development or enhancement. We suggest that as pipelines are
assessed with more rigor to rule out risky drugs, the portfolio shrinks and firms launch less drugs
over a long period of time. This is another plausible explanation as to why portfolios shrink
post-merger.

81

IV.4 Individual Behaviors
After gaining insight into managers’ perspectives of the firms’ goals, processes, and
methods, we asked managers three questions relating to their individual behavior during merger
activities within their respective firms.
Personal Goals. Theory of Narrative Thought states that values help form the narrative
thought of individuals, which then influences their decision making. One of three questions we
asked managers is: “Have your personal goals changed since the firm has merged?” Figure 15
displays the common themes of the managers’ personal goals after the merger.
Seven managers indicated that a change in personal goals had occurred after the merger.
Six managers said their goals had changed. All of the managers aligned their personal goals with
that of the firms’. The subcategories generated during coding include: (a) gain more experience,
(b) knowledge expansion, (c) enhance skillset and (d) job stability. Overall, most of the managers
saw the merger as an opportunity to gain more experience to secure their careers.
Career Growth and Enhanced Skillet. Informant2 leveraged the merger by gaining
experience for her next career. Informant2 shared how she plans her personal goal during merger
activities:
“As you appreciate, it would be much of what happens in one’s career
sometimes driven by events you can't control as you say by a company getting
bought or positioned being eliminated. I'm always of the mindset that I need to
be my own advocate for where I might go next or what opportunity or risk I want
to take. I look at that and see, can I put these pieces together and then, will that
get me to where I think I want to go? It's funny you asked because I have been
thinking a lot about, "Well, what will my next job be and what did that look like
and what are pieces that I'm interested in?" I've been thinking a lot about where
my current kind of interest is and even though I don't have a lot of formal
experience there, I'm very interested in [industry], so I've been spending a lot of
time with [department] colleagues at PharmaAlphaII just trying to learn and get
involved to where I can.”
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Career Growth

Gain More
Experience
Increased Skillset
Knowledge
Expansion
Job Security

Figure 15 Managers’ Personal Goals
Informant 3’s personal goal strategy was similar to Informant2’s:
“I think now that they have so many different avenues you can go down, and
PharmaAlphaII offers so much training, there's a lot of things you can get
involved in. When I started, I was just working with the established brands and
products, as well as, like I mentioned the pipeline products. Now that I've been
involved with that one [product], there's a [branch of medicine] side of it, and
so now my focus has shifted to the [branch of medicine] side of it, so I'm kind of
passionate about that. I really didn't know a whole lot about [branch of
medicine], so now my goal is to learn more about that [branch of medicine]
population, and [disease] and determine how I can add value to that.”
Informant12 shared the same personal goals as Informant3 and Informant2:
“It's going to force me to be a lot more patient. I'm not going to be able to
achieve the things that I want to do in the time frame I need to, because they're
just much more deliberate about how your career is going to move and how fast
and in which directions. You have to just plan things out on a longer timeline to
where you want to be versus at PharmaTheta, I think you could have done in a
much, much shorter timeline.”
Job Stability and Knowledge Expansion. Informant4 aimed to increase her knowledge
after the merger:
“It makes it more interesting; growing, doing things that are more impactful for
the organization, have a deeper understanding of what's going on in the
industry.”
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Personal Stake in Decision Outcome. We asked managers: “What’s personally at stake
when making portfolio decisions?” Consistent with the change in personal goals as a result of
the merger, managers considered their reputation when making decisions. Table 26 shows the
managers’ narratives and categories of what’s personally at stake for them when making
portfolio decisions.

Table 26 Personal Stake in Decision
Number of Subcategory of Narratives
Informants
5
Good representation of client, reputation, more respect,
integrity, good relationship with marketing, esteem
7
Good guidance, good decisions realized, desire to make
great contributions, avoid failures, concerned about
losing, to know that I've done a good job, sense of
building company and patient therapies, achievement,
positive outcome, just want to succeed
3
Bonus, income
3

Gaining more knowledge and experience, better career
exposure, job security

Category
Reputation
Success

Reward
Career
Growth

Five managers felt their reputation was at stake while making portfolio decisions. These
managers looked forward to the esteem of their leaders and colleagues as a result of a good
decision.

It was also important for the majority of managers (seven) to make a worthy

contribution to the firm through their decision making. Managers sought to provide proper
guidance to aid in final decision making that results in a viable portfolio. Most of these
managers want to succeed in making the right decisions for the firm. Few managers (three) felt
their income bonuses were at stake when making decisions.
When making portfolio decisions, two managers spoke strongly about their concern for
human resources. Informant5 passionately expressed his personal stake in potential resource
loss:
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“There's nothing worse than having to let people go because the company bet
on the wrong horse or the company made a bad decision. There's an awful lot
more at stake than personal income. I'll survive, I'll go get another job. That's
not an issue, in your term it hurts, but it's more really how it affects the company,
especially small companies. They take a long time to recover from a major
mistake or a major bad decision. That's the one thing. We're really here to build
the company, to build the careers of the people who are committed to working
alongside us as we build these places. To me that's an awful lot more painful to
see that one got away than to see your bonus cut by 20%. Yeah, it's nice to get
an extra 20% on your bonus, but it's a whole lot better to go out and hire 40 new
people who might have been working at the coal industry.”
Likewise, Informant6 emphasized the importance of people in his decision making:
“I typically don't look at my personal part of it. I look at it from more of an
outcome-based decision maker. If my decision is going to help the outcome I will
do it and also very strong in terms of emotional intelligence, look at any impact
on people. Those are the two that I would look at. Am I going to achieve the
objective or the outcome? In the process, what I'm I going to actually lose, if
any? Especially when it comes to people, I want to make sure that achieving the
outcome cannot be by killing like 500 people in between. You got to make sure
that you balance that in terms of what hardship my decision would bring to
people and what is the positive outcome that would actually let.”

It was interesting to discover that managers don’t only think of themselves when making
decisions. They consider the livelihood of those around them as well. This discovery suggests
that managers may make decisions in favor of people rather than of the firm.

Rewards & Recognition. After learning that reputation, success, reward and career
growth are personally at stake when making decisions, we asked managers: “Are you rewarded
for the decisions you make?” All managers are rewarded for decisions made, with the exception
of Informant2 and Informant12. Figure 16 shows the four common rewards granted to
respective managers. One of the two managers who were not rewarded indicated that there was
no mechanism in place to measure success after the merger.
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Most managers encountered tangible and intangible rewards as a result of making good
decisions. Tangible rewards came in the form of financial incentives, such as bonuses and profit
sharing programs. Intangible rewards included gaining the trust of governance boards that
resulted in opportunities to learn cross-functionally and take on more decision-making
responsibilities. Earning the trust of managers’ respective leadership teams and being regarded
in high esteem were other rewards.

Interestingly, few managers stated that they were not

penalized for bad decisions or outcomes. Rather, they were told to do better and try harder next
time. It is also worth mentioning that only one manager viewed early stage success of the firm’s
portfolio as a reward.
• Informant1
• Informant11
• Informant13
• Informant5
• Informant6

Bonuses

Expanded
Roles

Esteem

Trust

• Informant4
• Informant13
• Informant8

• Informant3
• Informant4
• Informant8
• Ifnormant7
• Informant13

• Informant3
• Informant13
• Informant8

Figure 16 Managers’ Rewards
Individual Decision Making. The next question directly addresses our research question:
How do managers make portfolio decisions during a merger? We asked managers: “Can you
describe a recent portfolio decision?” We followed the question with: “Did the merger
influence this decision?” We captured each manager’s approach to decision making and
provided a general description of the decision scenario. Figure 17 displays managers’
approaches.
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The decision outcome presented by managers involved one of the following categories:
(a) product licensing, (b) abbreviated new drug administration, (c) portfolio alignment, (d)
portfolio strategy, and (e) new market entry. All managers felt their decisions were influenced
by the merger, with the exception of Informant3 and Informant13. Across all firms, the
governance board influenced managers’ decisions.

Considered
Lessons Learned

•
•
•
•

Informant1
*Informant3
Informant4
Informant8

Considered Risks

•
•
•
•

Informant1
Informant6
Informant7
Informant8

Aligned Decision
with Firms' Goals

•
•
•
•

Informant2
Informant5
Informant7
Informant6

Relied on
Financial Models

• Informant11
• *Informant13
• Informant6

Figure 17 Managers’ Approaches to Decision Making

*Decision making was not influenced by merger
Managers had four common approaches to decision making. Some managers adopted a
combination of these approaches. One approach taken by four managers was to consider lessons
learned from their decisions made during former mergers. Managers recalled how past mergers
were approached and mimicked its success, as well as avoided its failures. These managers
mentioned being more disciplined in their decision making. Prior to their merger experience,
they reported ignoring warning signs of drugs that seemed promising.
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A second approach was to identify risks. Four managers adopted this approach and
generated risk responses for portfolio risks. Managers taking this approach mentioned fear of
losing market share for making wrong decisions.
A third approach was to align the decisions with the firms’ goals. The four managers
utilizing this approach indicated that their decision making was heavily influenced by the
acquiring firm’s governance board. Further, decisions had to be tailored to meet the needs of the
new leadership of the merged entity. Informant2 described how the merger influenced one of her
recent decisions:
“The key reasons why senior management didn't support it really were
multifold. One happened to be that the time at which this opportunity went in
front of the executive committee and essentially the CEO and [his/her] senior
team, the company was going through a global reorganization. Unfortunately,
the individuals who were in part of the dialog and who have been involved or
updated on the deal for the prior six months completely changed. You had a
whole new group of decision-makers, stakeholders so I think that was a
challenge. Then also, there were just very different priorities amongst that new
group in terms of where they wanted to focus their respective resources.”

In many cases, the new leadership team and the change in firm goals changed how managers
approached decision making after the merger. Informant6 indicated that a portfolio decision was
made before the merger, but changed when the merger was announced. He stated:
“The new leader had a new plan for the organization which we all aligned on,
which means we need to make these changes to make sure that we get behind
it.”
The fourth approach was the reliance on financial models. Managers who adopted this
approach practiced evidence-based decision making. These managers built financial models and
assessed them against pre- and post-merger portfolios. Informant1 focused on being objective in
his decision making and not allowing political influence to drive his decisions. He stated:
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“We tried to be as objective as possible and just based it on the data, as opposed
to being influenced by the politics.”
Managers sought out ways to apply evidence-based approaches to decision making.

Difficult Decision Making. The complexities of mergers can create an environment of
uncertainty and complexity where managers can be faced with difficult decision making. For
this reason, we aimed to determine how managers make decisions when faced with uncertainty.
The previous responses provided insight into the general decision-making approaches taken by
managers. To gauge managers’ decision-making approaches when faced with uncertainty, we
asked managers: “Can you describe a situation in which you were confronted with a difficult
portfolio decision during a merger?” We then asked managers: “Were you satisfied with the
decision?” We captured the manager’s decision scenario and elements that made the decision
difficult. We then classified their risk responses into two main categories: (a) avoid and (b)
accept.
For this study, we define risk avoidance as making a change to the portfolio decision.
Risk acceptance is proceeding with the decision as planned and having a response plan in place
in the event the risk occurs. Table 27 shows the managers’ risk responses when making difficult
decisions during a merger.
Lack of agreement between decision-makers was key to making managers’ decisions
difficult. When describing the complexity of a decision, Informant8 concluded with the
following statement:
“I'd say the dichotomy in beliefs within the team made it a very challenging
situation and decision.”
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The level of risk associated with the decision also complicated managerial decision making.
Managers who were faced with risky decisions avoided the risks. Other complexities included
fear of making wrong decisions, lack of experience and complexity of matrix organization.
Decisions that involved drugs in phase I (early stage) under constrained R&D budgets also
complicated managerial decision making.
One manager noted their intuition went against the evidence presented, hence making the
decision extremely difficult. This manager accepted the risk and carried out the decision.
All managers were satisfied with the decision they’d made when faced with uncertainty.
Six managers accepted risks and carried out their decisions. Four managers avoided risks and
made new decisions.
Although most managers’ firms were more risk averse post-merger, the majority of
managers took more risks when making complex decisions during merger activities. This
finding contradicts literature that reveals managers adopt a firm’s risk aversion during decision
making. Although we’ve found that managers align their goals with that of the firms’ while
making decisions, they tend to abandon their firm alignment when faced with uncertainty. We
elaborate further on this finding in a later chapter.
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Table 27 Managers’ Risk Approaches to Difficult Decision
Informant
Decision
Reason for Difficulty
Informant2
Informant3

Partnership
Terminate Drug

Risky negotiation
Lack of agreement between decisionmakers

Informant13

R&D Site Closure

Complexity of Decision
Approval process
Risky investment

Informant1

Divest generic drug

Informant8

Delay Launch

Informant6

Global Expansion

Risk
Response

Avoid

Lack of agreement between decisionmakers
Intuition conflicted with evidence
Lack of experience
Accept

Informant7

Product Development

Constrained R&D budget

Informant11

Drug Selection

Phase I Development

Informant12

Manufacturing Site
Closure
Terminate promotion of
drug

Fear of making wrong decision

Informant4

Complexity of matrix organization

Managers’ Past Experiences. To further explore TNT, we asked managers: “Do you
think your past experiences influences your portfolio decisions now?” We captured narratives
from 10 managers and displayed them in Table 28.
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Table 28 Managers’ Narratives - Influence of Past Experiences
Informant
Quotes
Informant1
“Yes, past experiences inform portfolio decisions. Lessons learned from
previous deals make me look at deals differently today.”
Informant2

“Yes, in terms of experience. Have objectivity but experience has impact on
how to position the opportunity or head off challenges. Think about how
things could potentially occur just based on experiences I’ve had.”

Informant3

“Yes, previously did what you were told to do. Once importance is
understood, can make better decision making. You look at things from a
different aspect when you're a little bit more seasoned than when you start
off.”

Informant4

“Yes, can provide insight now. I have more knowledge. I am able to pinpoint
“go”/”no go” decisions.”

Informant5

“Yes, absolutely. Once burned, twice shy. I view the future through prism of
the past. The lessons you've learned, good or bad, influence every decision we
all make.”

Informant6

“Yes, knowledge from years at previous pharma firms. Also experiences
from training classes.”

Informant7

“Yes, past experiences about culture of R&D. I make recommendations
based on experience. I’ve learned from 6 previous M&A.”

Informant8

“Yes, past experience in different therapeutic areas are good. Important to
consider other viewpoints. Allow you to play out scenarios. Leveraging past
experiences is important.”

Informant11

“Yes, ability to be objective and neutral.”

Informant12

“Yes, I’ve learned throughout my career. Each time a product is evaluated I
learn. You're learning from your past experiences and picking up on things
that maybe you hadn't the previous time but this time you're looking for this
time.”

Informant13

“Yes, absolutely for sure. I gain new knowledge. It never stops. Would make
decision differently 10 years ago than now. In the past, I was focused on gut
feelings rather than facts. Gut gives you more truth in private life but not in
business.”
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Consistent with TNT, all managers said past experiences influence their portfolio
decisions today. Managers’ narratives also revealed that past experiences inform their portfolio
decisions today. Many of the managers adopted strategies that have worked at other firms to aid
them in post-merger decision making at existing firms. Most of the managers utilized past
experiences as a mechanism for foreseeing risks and planning risk responses.
In all instances, managers drew from past experiences to forecast the outcomes of their
decisions. Many managers felt past experiences helped them play out scenarios of expected
outcomes that enabled them to make better decisions. Lastly, when managers recalled failed
experiences, they avoided a similar decision that led to a failed outcome. Similarly, managers
who experienced failed outcomes avoided similar decisions that led to the failure. Informant5
shared how past experiences influence his decision making today with the following explanation:
“If you've had trouble with one of the agency's divisions or teams, inflexibility
from that decision, you’re not comfortable going there again. The same way if
you've had success with a disease state or success with a group at the agency or
success with a group of clinical researchers, it tends to become kind of a favorite
of well I know how to do that one, I think I can do that one well. Let's go back
and swim in that same pool again.”

Informant13 discussed how his past experiences influence decisions today. Informant13 stated
that decisions made in the past were based on gut feelings, and decisions made today are based
on the outcome of the past:
“You never decide along this kind of stuff, but by the time we make decision and
there's a thorough discussion about every single aspect, you can raise your
opinion about it and raise your gut feeling as well based on your experience.
But clearly the bigger value is from the facts before the gut feeling. Even in the
past, we make decisions based on gut feelings. Today everything is more based
on what it was in the past.”
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Consistent with TNT, all managers made similar statements regarding how their past experiences
influences how they make decisions today. We posit that in the context of a merger, managers
make decisions based upon the outcome of a decision made in a previous merger. Even when
evidence lends to the type of decision that should be made, managers will bypass that evidence
and mimic the decisions from previous outcomes that were favorable.

IV.5 Merger Impact
Portfolio Growth/Decline. Prior literature informs us that R&D portfolios shrink after
M&A. We asked managers: “In short, do you feel the merger will result in more or fewer drugs
being funded, developed, and launched?” Table 29 displays managers’ perspectives on impact
of merger to drugs.
Table 29 Managers’ Portfolio Forecasts Post-Merger
Informant
More or Less Drugs Theme
Acquiring
Informant1
Grows pipeline
Informant3
Informant11
Informant8

Informant2
Informant4
Informant10

Informant7

Informant5
Informant6
Informant12
Informant13

Increases revenue and investments
More

Decreases R&D Expenditures
Less
Terminates drugs

Less

Acquired
Decreases R&D expenditures and investments

Grows pipeline
More

Enables market expansion
Provides more resources
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Eight managers felt the merger would result in more drugs being funded, developed and
launched, while three managers felt it would result in less drugs. All managers, except one, from
acquired firms felt the mergers would result in more drugs. Four managers from acquiring firms
felt the merger would result in more drugs, while three felt it would result in less drugs.
Managers who believe the merger would result in more drugs felt the mergers would
grow the R&D pipelines. Their belief is that the merger would provide more human and capital
resources to enhance R&D capabilities. These managers also felt the merger would enable
market expansion into new therapeutic areas. The belief of these managers is that the mergers
would make the firm bigger and less risk averse. Informant3 mentioned that her firm’s
willingness to accept more risks after the merger would grow the firm’s pipeline:
“I think they're going to take risks in the future to bring these things to market
and re-strategize how they're brought to market.”
Managers who felt the merger would result in less drugs believe the merger would
negatively impact R&D funding. Additionally, these managers felt drugs would be terminated
due to overlap. Although the portfolio would result in less drugs after the merger, Informant2
felt that patient focus was more important than pipeline growth in terms of quantity. She states:
“I think it's not so much about numbers anymore. I think it really is about what
is going to make a difference to the patient or the patient’s family, patient group
type of scenario. I may think that market place is very different now.”
Informant1 emphasized the importance of pursuing and funding drugs that were the main
driver of M&A. Informant1 provided the risk in acquiring firms for the sake of portfolio growth
without a clear strategy in his response:
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“If you cut R&D especially along those brands, you undercut the purpose for
acquiring those companies unlike other models where you might have come
across this in your research where companies are just buying other companies
and as a way, that is their R&D. They're just buying existing portfolios in
companies and they're putting almost zero in the research and development side.
That hasn't been our experience but I certainly know that is a model and that's
actually an interesting model. An analogy would be if you just instead of drafting
rookies, you just go and get free agents, right? interesting that some companies
are really leveraging up that way and just saying we have no R&D besides
acquiring companies. Who knows which one will succeed or not?

It’s worth mentioning that while most managers perceived that mergers would result in more
drugs, we interpret their perspectives as looking at the new merged firm as having more drugs
than their previous (acquired or acquiring) firm. Further investigation into how managers
conclude that mergers result in more drugs is needed given that evidence suggests otherwise.
Firm Challenges. One of our final questions to managers was: “Have mergers made
your portfolio decision making more challenging?” We’ve charted these challenges in Table 30
and categorized them into five categories: (a) unclear strategy, (b) hidden product issues, (c)
termination of drugs, (d) new culture and (e) different data systems.
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Table 30 Merger Challenges
Informant
More Challenging
Informant2
Need clarity on strategy. What does M&A look like?
Strategic view isn't always conveyed. What opportunities are
you seeking?
Informant8

The more products, the more resources are required. Do we
value more breadth in multiple disease areas or in one?

Informant5

Competitive landscape changes dramatically. May not make
decisions based on current landscape.

Informant1

Lack of focus on which therapeutic area to focus on. Harder
to get drugs approved outside of therapeutic focus.

Informant3

Inherited issues. Legacy behind product, history of product.

Informant4

Lack of outside data.

Informant7

Have to cut a lot of drugs.

Informant11

Overlapping drugs.

Informant12

Decision by committee. Countless number of people
involved. Too much Pre-work involved. Twenty-five chefs
in the kitchen instead of one. Everyone feels responsible.
There are 20-30 people asking when, where, why, how from
too many committees.

Informant6

Making the decisions in new culture is what makes it difficult.

Informant13

Acquired firms using different data analysis systems and
tools.

Theme
Unclear
strategy

Hidden
product issues

Termination
of drugs

Different
culture

Different data
analysis
systems

All managers from acquiring and acquired firms stated that mergers made their decision making
more challenging. Four managers’ merger challenges stemmed from not having clarity on the
the new firm’s strategy. These strategies included the merged firms’ focus, expected outcome,
and resource commitments.

97
Two managers stated that the firm’s new culture made decision making complex and
convoluted. For these managers, the merged firms’ governance boards were too large and
different leaders had preferences for which drugs were selected for the portfolio. Informant12
provided insight into the impact of having too many decision-makers:
“You have 25 chefs in the kitchen instead of one. It's a constant struggle, because
everyone feels as though they are the ones that are responsible for it. Every step
and every stage you go through, you have 10 or 15 or 20 people asking you why
and where and how come and did you do this and did you think of that. It's a
nonstop barrage through several different committees that you've answered the
question four times over. You consider things and don't have it in writing and
they keep drilling you on the same topics. It's just a lot of extra work.”
This culture of “decision by committee” make decision making long and frustrating.
Two managers from the same acquiring firm had challenges with not knowing the true
history of the acquired firm’s drugs. Informant4 spoke of her firm making decisions to proceed
with development and launch of a product with the expectation that it would generate a lot of
revenue even when forecasted data showed that it would not. Informant4 elaborated on this
challenge by stating how leaders make a decision that doesn’t support the data:
“You make this decision. You think it’s going to be a big product that will
generate a lot of money but here is market research that's telling you it's not.”
One manager from an acquiring firm experienced challenges with having a different
system for analyzing data than that of the acquired firm. Information between these two merged
firms is shared by exchanging excel spreadsheets. This manual method of information sharing
made it difficult to analyze data in the same manner.
Suggested Merger Improvements. Following our merger challenges question to
managers, we asked managers: “What one thing would make portfolio decision making less
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challenging?” All managers provided suggestions for making M&A less challenging for
decision-makers.
The most common feedback from five managers was the need to neutralize and
streamline the portfolio decision-making processes. The necessity to make unified decisions is
critical for the success of a merged portfolio. Managers stated that the criteria for decision
making should be merged and adopted so that the expected outcomes can be based off of the
same data. The need to be objective and neutral when selecting the portfolio from the merged
entity was also suggested. One manager suggested that this could be best achieved by allowing a
third party firm to make portfolio decisions after the merger. Another manager emphasized the
need to analyze data in the same manner after the merger. It was also suggested that firms
consider acquisition of firms that possess products that align with the firm’s long term goals.
Informant1 stated that by communicating the firm’s strategy, managers can make better
decisions. Informant1 suggested:
“I think in terms of portfolio management, it's helpful to have a sort of "Okay,
here's where we're going, here's what we want to do" because then people can
make decisions about "do we want to keep maintaining those drugs or keep any
effort around those drugs or not."

The second most common feedback from three managers was the need to explore the true
costs of the acquisition. These costs included cost of the merger and R&D development.
Managers suggested that the acquiring firm ensure there is adequate cash reserves to fund the
merger and sustain R&D after the merger.

Managers advised that acquiring firms should look

at synergies and acquire firms that help close the gap and meet long team goals. Informant7
provided what he felt was key to maximizing synergies. Informant7 advised:
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“If you have a merger and you already have an ophthalmic group and then you
buy another ophthalmic group, then there's obviously going to be layoffs in both
groups for you to get that synergy and those are the ones that are the most
difficult. That's where you make the most mistakes.”
Informant7 recommends firms engage in what he calls a “bolt-on’ merger, where its buys and
acquires a new company and add it to something to complete the gap. Informant7 provided an
example of a pharma firm with an ophthalmic unit buying another ophthalmic unit that
completed or extended the ophthalmic portfolio. Further, managers suggested that firms
consider the risks of cutting early stage R&D development to gain short-term wins with later
stage developments. It was also suggested that R&D personnel not be eliminated after the
merger so that knowledge is not not lost during merger activities.
Another common suggestion from two managers was to perform due diligence on the
firm to be acquired before the merger. Managers also suggested that decision-makers
aggressively explore all of the data for the drugs being acquired. Managers from acquiring
firms suggested that acquired firms be transparent and forthcoming about potential drug issues.
Informant6 stated that it is important for leaders to practice transparency at the firm level.
Informant 6 revealed:
“Transparency as a leader behavior within the organization would actually help
in decision making because there is nothing to hide. People are very transparent
about what's going on and sharing the information and the facts to a point where
we could really make a decision. There are other factors as well, since you asked
for one I'm saying transparency.”
Although managers demonstrated some level of frustration with pharma mergers, it was
interesting that none of them suggested that mergers cease. Instead, all of them openly provided
suggestions for making M&A better. This observation signals that managers feel mergers can
result in firm growth if firms look deeper into its merger strategies and make the necessary
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adjustments to enhance merger effectiveness. We have included managers’ suggestions for
improving merger acvtivities in Table 31.

Table 31 Suggested Improvements for Merger Effectiveness
Informant
Suggested Improvements
Informant2
Look at clinical phase programs. Consider development costs.
Too much focus on enhancing R&D capabilities.
Informant7

Theme
Explore true
lifecycle
costs

Get the synergies. Create savings to fund merger (usually done by
shaving resources). Keep productive paths of R&D groups intact.
When R&D takes a cut, future developments are at risk. Don’t
kills everything in early stage R&D.
Don’t get rid of R&D staff that knows most about the asset.

Informant8
Informant 3

At pre-clinical stage, make tougher decisions early on. New
indications. Make decision if we can afford the investment.
Be transparent. Perform Due diligence. Research the agency.

Informant6

Transparency – know what's really going on. Share the facts.

Informant4

Outside data would make it more successful. Expand knowledge
if successful.

Due
Diligence

Informant5

Equivalent information across both firms so that the team are
making decisions from the same depth. Ability to gain seamless
equivalent basis of knowledge. Bring forward streamlined
portfolio decisions templates. Unified decisions.

Informant11

Have 3rd party do the evaluation for portfolio selection.

Neutralize
and
streamline
portfolio
decisionmaking
process

Informant12

More streamlined approach. Less people making decisions. Right
people involved in decision making.
Decision-makers weighted towards acquiring firm.

Informant13

If companies share same systems, data analysis done the same
way. Data and optimization would make it better. Long process to
connect all internal systems to one. One service organization
with long-term outlook.

Informant1

Inherit products that are part of firm’s long-term goals. Can make
better decisions about keeping and maintaining drugs.

Transparency
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V

DISCUSSION

The findings from this study address the research question: How do pharmaceutical
managers make portfolio decisions during a merger? In this section, we conclude our learnings
and collectively reveal insights gained by listening to managers and analyzing their responses
through the lens of TNT. We discuss contributions to the area of PfM by discussing the gaps in
the literature that lack how pharma managers actually make portfolio decisions during merger
activities. Further, we provide suggestions for how pharma firms could approach future M&A such
that R&D portfolios are not negatively impacted. We also provide managerial implications and
limitations of the study. Lastly, we provide a reflection of the engaged scholarship experience from
a practitioner’s perspective.

V.1 Decision Making and Goal Alignment
Many pharmaceutical news outlets report M&A activity, including predictions for rumored
acquisitions of giant firms buying smaller or competitor firms. Within these outlets, the acquiring
firms consistently report the goal of the M&A as an attempt to grow the firm’s pipeline and
enhance R&D capabilities. The findings from this study support this claim, in that the overall goal
of a merger is to achieve firm growth. Other goals, such as acquiring a new footprint and
advancing into new therapeutic areas, also align with prior literature on the goals of M&A. Firms
aim to be long-term focused pre- and post-merger, with great intent to enhance R&D capabilities.
Firms aim to make these goals attainable.
Although firms share a common goal to enhance the pipeline by engaging in M&A, their
goals change after the merger.

Through exploration, we’ve discovered that the strategy of the

firm is changed by the new leadership of the merged firm. Firms also become more R&D driven
with the new leadership team. Although financial growth is still the ultimate goal of firms, a new
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goal emerged that also focuses on patient disease. Also, firms are focused on the expansion of
therapeutic areas.
Managers in this study said they align decisions with their firms’. While this is evident
under pre-merger conditions, managers deviate from alignment with firm goals when making
decisions under post-merger conditions. One possible explanation for this finding is that most
managers, along with the firm, change their goals after a merger. We suggest that the complexity
of a firm’s post-merger goal realignment, coupled with a more career-focused manager,
contributes to a misalignment of firm/manager goals. As a result, managers guide their decisions
heavily based upon what they feel would benefit their career and lead to job security. Manager’s
post-merger focus on careers could interfere with their ability to make more rational decisions
during a merger.

V.2 Managers’ Portfolio Perspectives
With a common goal to achieve firm growth, we gained insight into how managers view
their firm’s portfolio condition pre- merger, as well as their expectations of the portfolio postmerger. We found that the majority of managers from acquiring and acquired firms predicted
that their firm’s portfolio would have more drugs funded, developed, and launched as a result of
the merger. Very few managers predicted a decline in the merged portfolio, despite the
literature’s claim that R&D expenditures and pipelines typically decrease after M&A. One
possible explanation for this perspective is that managers engage in system one thinking, where
fast, contextual stories lead them astray because they are not aware of their own errors
(Kahneman, Lovallo, & Sibony, 2011). Managers subconsciously envision the coupling of two
firms’ portfolios, which logically would result in two portfolios within one firm. Managers
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imagine the merged firm as having more drugs and capabilities. This explanation is supported
by responses from two informants in this study. Informant 13 states:
“I will say, more drugs, better drugs, more revenue and better cash
flows. Could think less because you clear out the portfolio first and you look for
redundancies. You don't keep everything that was there in the past but then
there's the joined forces, you can do better and you can do more.”
Informant6 states:
“The beginning of the merger will always look like it's more, but then it balances
out.”
Both managers’ initial responses were that the merged firm’s portfolio would result in more
drugs. However, the latter part of their responses supports system two thinking, where they
reflect and think about how the portfolio would actually result in fewer drugs. Throughout this
study, we have consistently discovered contradictions where managers’ perspectives and actual
behaviors differ.
We researched financial performance of firms in this study and found that half of the
firms’ revenues declined post-merger. We found that smaller pharma firms experienced more
growth than larger pharma firms. FierceBiotech reported that the pharmaceutical giant Pfizer,
since its mergers, has been mired by poor performance in R&D for more than a decade (“What
can Gilead, Biogen, and Celgene teach Big Pharma,” 2015). Despite prior research on
pharmaceutical M&A, firms still believe they will grow after M&A, especially within R&D.
Consistent with TNT, managers forecast the future condition of the portfolio based on their
past experiences with M&A within their existing or past firms. It was discovered that managers,
prior to making a prediction, recall events of past mergers failures or successes, and form an
opinion about a future outcome based on that experience.
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Managers also have a notion that the future of a portfolio is heavily based on luck. This
belief is consistent with Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) who state that often what gets decided
depends strongly upon timing and luck. Managers feel that even when evidence shows that drugs
have a promising future and are selected for a portfolio, they could potentially result in failed
performance.

A possible explanation for this occurrence is the manager’s limited focus on

adherence to standardized process and methods for portfolio selections. March (1991) states that
organization decision making involves more than just valuation methods and processes. March
(1991) also states that decision-makers are forced to make decisions based on information provided
to them and that better decisions are be made when a holistic view is granted. We posit that
managers’ decisions should go beyond portfolio selection. Managers should also contribute
towards decisions regarding the merger strategy of the firm so that a more holistic approach to
portfolio decision making can be taken.
It is worth mentioning that portfolio forecasts can differ between managers within the same
firm. We discovered that managers from different functional areas within the same firm had
differing opinions of the firm’s pre- and post-merger portfolio condition. This finding suggests
that individuals have their own internal pre-defined criteria for defining a successful portfolio.
Given this, even prescribed decision-making methods cannot ensure an unbiased, objective
approach to portfolio decision making. This could be a key discovery as to why R&D portfolios
decline after M&A. If standard methods and processes are followed, the introduction of biases
into the portfolio decision-making process could be detrimental to a firm if managers’ goals are
not aligned with the firms’. Depending upon managers’ attitudes about the merger and their
personal values, their goals can vary. One informant from this study reveals that his personal goals
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are influenced by how he envisions the future. Informant7 says the following when asked if his
personal goals had changed post-merger:
“I guess it depended on how you felt about the mergers and acquisitions and
whether you the acquiree or the acquirer, and how you were personally affected
by it. If you were treated well and promoted or given a good position at the
merger and acquisition, then obviously you were going to feel a lot better about
it. Your goals were going to be good.”

Managers’ interests align with that of the firms’. However, as the informant above
suggests, their goals change after the merger. Post-merger, managers seek to gain more
experience by securing new roles within the merged firm in efforts to expand their
knowledge. This suggests that managers align their portfolio decisions with their personal
goals. This discovery helps explain why portfolios decline post-merger, in that managers’
biases could negatively impact the portfolio decision-making process. This claim is
supported by Kahneman et al. (2011), who reveals a study by McKinsey where more than
1,000 major business investments showed that when organizations worked at reducing
the effect of bias in their decision-making processes, they achieve returns up to seven
percentage points higher.

V.3 Decision-Making Processes and Methods
The decision-making processes are relatively the same across firms pre- and post-merger.
Firms institute a governance board of functional leaders and investors to make final portfolio
decisions. Managers follow the traditional economical decision-making processes and methods
as outlined in the literature. Managers also partake in the traditional annual portfolio review
meetings, and assess market conditions to assist with prioritizing the portfolio. Most managers
feel methods are effective. We confirmed that methods were most effective when an evidence-
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based approach is taken, and when there is transparency with the data. When buy-in is obtained
across multiple functional areas, better decisions can be made because of the varying
perspectives of drug’s potential risks and growth opportunities.
Decision-making methods are ineffective when there is a failure to integrate the culture
and systems used to analyze drug data. We learned that the culture of a newly merged pharma
firm is highly political and sometimes negatively influences portfolio decisions. This finding is
consistent with experimental evidence provided by Weber and Camerer (as cited by Oh et al.,
2014), that the conflict between the organizational culture of two firms involved in a merger can
contribute to post-merger performance deterioration. The complexity of the integration from the
merger contributes towards method ineffectiveness because the acquiring firm’s leadership team
dominate the decision-making process by bypassing the processes set forth by the firm’s
governance board.
We observed that managers do not always rely on processes and methods to aid in
portfolio decision making. Our study reveals that the legacy and new management team rely
heavily on intuition as a method for making portfolio decisions during merger activities. This
approach is consistent with the pyramid of decision approaches presented by Schoemaker and
Russo (1993), where intuitive decision-making is often undertaken when faced with pressure and
complexities as a result of mergers. The reliance on intuitive decision making by leaders often
interfered with evidence-based recommendations brought forth by managers. They sometimes
follow gut feelings, and seek out drugs that align with their own personal interests. One
informant mentioned that managers within his firm treat drugs like their babies. He states:
“These research programs become people's children, their babies. If somebody
had a personal investment in an idea, it's very hard to give that up.”

107
This statement suggests that managers seek further development of drugs they’ve envisioned to
succeed, despite evidence-based data that suggest otherwise. Managers fall into this confirming
evidence trap, which Hammond, Keeney, and Raiffa (2006) defines as seeking out information
that supports managers’ existing instincts or point of view while avoiding information that
contradicts it. Through the lens of TNT, managers engage in this type behavior when they’ve
experienced previous success in continuing on with development of less than promising drugs or
with drugs that seemed promising pre-merger. This behavior leads to R&D investments that are
potentially wasted on drugs that may never produce long-term value. Over time, R&D budgets
diminish and long-term investments can no longer be funded. For this reason, R&D portfolios
decline.
When there are changes in the decision-making processes and methods post-merger, they
tend to be drastic. Pre-merger processes of less experienced pharma firms involve a small
number of decision-making executives who make ad-hoc decisions based upon external
influences, with no buy-in from other internal managers. Post-merger, firms adopt a more
traditional approach to decision making. However, the new leadership team of the merged firm
is prone to take a biased approach towards portfolio selection. Despite the evidence-based
recommendations for the merged portfolio, managers tend to terminate early-stage development
and focus more on the later stage ones that could launch to market faster. This action contradicts
the stated goals of the firm’s post-merger long-term focus on R&D and the goal of the merger to
enhance R&D capabilities. Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland (1990) states that if top-level managers
have a low commitment to innovation, they will provide few rewards and incentives for creating
and championing innovations. This supports our finding that managers consider what’s
personally at stake for them when making portfolio decisions. Managers sometimes select drugs
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for a portfolio that are championed by senior managers who have direct influence over their
careers. Further, we observed that managers will not reveal all of the evidence for a drug that
has potential issues when they know investors and executives are in favor of it. We propose that
this behavior occurs when managers fear their reputation or job will be negatively impacted.
Paese, Bieser, and Tubbs (1993) identify this behavior as framing, where managers avoid risk
when they perceive having something to gain. We posit that managers will not position a drug
for a portfolio if they do not feel they have anything to gain.

V.4 Making Decisions under Uncertainty
There is a change in a firm’s risk aversion after the merger. Large acquiring firms tend to
become more risk-averse after M&A. Acquiring firms are less supportive of taking risks and
became more conscious of them post-merger. Informant7 from the acquiring firm, PharmaZeta,
stated that large acquiring firms take less risks:
“I think as a general statement, the larger a company is, the more risk averse it
gets.”
This claim is supported by Hitt et al. (1990), who found that large firms are more risk-averse than
risk–taking after an acquisition. A noteworthy change in firms as it relates to risk is that risk
management is implemented across all brands post-merger, versus a pre-merger risk focus on
blockbuster drugs. Contrary to Hammond et al. (2006) who stated acquired firms find themselves
stuck in the status quo trap after a merger because they don’t want to rock the boat, half of the
acquired firms in this study become less risk averse post-merger. More importantly, more acquired
firms also experienced post-merger growth than acquiring firms.
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The literature suggests that managers’ risk tolerances align with that of the firms’. We
examined managers’ approaches to risks while making decisions when faced with uncertainty and
discovered that more than half of the managers became less risk-averse when making difficult
decisions during merger activities. Further, managers put the firms’ portfolios at risk, as well as
their jobs, financial rewards, and reputation. A possible explanation for this behavior is a finding
by Paese et al. (1993) that reveal managers seek risks when they perceive they have something to
lose. We posit that when faced with uncertainty during a merger, the negative framing that prior
mergers have presented sparks an insecurity in managers, causing them to make irrational
decisions. This behavior could negatively impact a firm’s portfolio, given that evidence from
Eisenhardt (1985) (as cited by Hitt et al., 1990) suggests that financial performance outcomes are
a function of managerial behavior.

V.5 How Managers Make Portfolio Decisions
This study addresses a gap in the literature that, to our knowledge, does not reveal how
managers actually make pharma portfolio decisions during a merger. Our evidence reveals that
managers make decisions by first recalling positive and negative outcomes from previous
mergers and other work experience. These past experiences are then utilized to plan risk
responses that will dictate their decisions. Managers use their imagination to plan scenarios for
both negative and positive outcomes. Managers constantly align their personal goals, such a
career growth, with how they feel the merged portfolios will perform. If they feel the portfolio
will not succeed, they seek out opportunities to learn new areas of the merged firm before
restructuring occurs that usually results in workforce reduction and R&D site closures. If the
merged portfolio looks promising, they align themselves within the firm where they feel there’s
job security.
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With the expectation of a promising future, managers are more risk conscious when
making decisions, and continuously adjust their decisions until the portfolio seems attractive.
While making these decisions, managers consider the risks to their reputation, financial stability,
and career. On occasion, managers “ethically manipulate” data to influence senior managers’
final decision. According to Paese et al. (1993), this positive framing is a risk aversion behavior
that managers demonstrate when they seek to gain something such as financial rewards, esteem
or job promotion.
Managers consider job stability when making portfolio decisions. When they feel the
decision outcome may not be favorable, they leave the firm before the decision outcome is
realized. Managers feel they lose before the merger even takes place when they foresee
uncertainty with the merger. This finding addresses the gap in the literature that calls for the
investigation of managers’ motives during decision making, as identified by Walter and Barney
(1990). We support the views of Schweizer and Patzelt (2012) that overcoming managers’
perceptions of uncertainty during the post-acquisition period is central to their firm commitment.

V.6 Merger Decision-Making Challenges
We’ve identified five distinct challenges that encumber managers’ portfolio decisions: (1)
unclear strategy, which entails lack of clarity in merger strategy and lack of focus on which
therapeutic area(s) to focus on; (2) hidden drug issues, which involves that lack of transparency
from the acquired firms in disclosing known product issues and the legacy of the product; (3)
termination of R&D drugs, which usually results in the termination of the wrong overlapping
drug, or drugs that require long-term development; (4) new culture, which lacks integration of
processes and a dominating decision-making process from the leadership team of the acquiring
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firm; and (5) different data analysis systems, which forces the acquiring firms to interpret
portfolio data from a different analytics tool with different portfolio decision-making criteria.
These challenges make managerial decision making more difficult and prolongs the
process of portfolio selection. We offer suggestions for overcoming these challenges in a later
section.

V.7 Key Findings
This study explored how managers make portfolio decisions during a merger. We’ve
presented our findings and have discussed our interpretation of managers’ perspectives through
the lens of TNT. A few key themes emerged from this study that are worth mentioning.

Rigor and Lack of Integration. Since methods and processes remained about the same
throughout the merger, we speculate that they were applied with greater rigor and lacked
integration. This is evident by the recurring challenges revealed by managers that exacerbated
decision-making during mergers. Expansion in the number of managers making decisions for
one portfolio from two merged firms created cultural conflicts that prolonged decision making.
Since the merged firm comprises of decision-making managers from acquired and acquiring
firms, the new governance board demanded a more thorough product analyses due to an
imbalance in knowledge about the history and performance of the drugs. The merged firm’s
CEO was likely focused more on ROI, which forced managers to terminate or divest risky drugs.
As a result, fewer drugs made it to late stage development which resulted in a decline in the
R&D portfolio.

112
Biases. Throughout this study, we observed that managers were unaware of their own
biases. There was disparity in managers’ perspectives and their actual behaviors. Managers felt
they were objective and unbiased when making portfolio decisions. Although they felt politics,
culture, and post-integration challenges made their decision making difficult, they did not
demonstrate they were aware that these challenges impacted their decision outcomes. Further,
they did not feel the merger affected their decision making. For example, all of the managers
stated adherence to standard decision-making processes, methods, evidence-based decisions, and
alignment with firm goals. However, when faced with uncertainty, all of the managers admitted
that past experiences influenced their decision making. Further, many of the managers stated
that they are guided by their intuition and gut feelings when making portfolio decisions.
Additionally, all of the managers stated that something was personally at stake for them when
making portfolio decisions. Managers’ biases can impact their portfolio decisions. Until
managers are aware of these biases, they will not consciously take measures to minimize them.
Unless these biases are addressed, firms may continue to see a decline in R&D portfolios.

Differing Portfolio Perspectives. Managers had an overwhelming difference in
perspectives of the condition of the firms’ current and future portfolios. Twice, we found that
managers within the same firm viewed the pre- and post-merger condition of their firm’s
portfolio differently. This finding erupted an alarming theme since all managers claimed to
measure portfolios against standard criteria. If the portfolio criteria within firms are the same,
how could managers have varying perspectives on its condition? The different within-firm
perspectives pose a problem for decision making because managers inject their internal criteria
into the portfolio decision-making process.

By doing so makes it impossible to objectively

evaluate a portfolio and maintain neutrality in portfolio selections. Further, managers within the
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same firms had different perspectives on the firm’s goal focus. Managers who view their firms
as long-term focused will likely favor early-stage developments, while managers who view their
term as short-term focused will likely favor later- stage developments. A lack of unified
portfolio success criteria makes it impossible for managers within the same firm to evaluate
portfolios in a similar manner.

V.8 Managerial Implications
Mergers and acquisitions will not cease within the near future for the pharma industry.
Pipelines may continue to be affected if firms fail to adjust their R&D strategies when engaging
in merger activities. We’ve captured some suggestions that may aid firms and managers in
overcoming decision-making challenges during merger activities.
First, we suggest that firms neutralize and streamline the portfolio decision-making
process during merger activities so that decision-making criteria from the acquired and acquiring
firms can be weighed against the same criteria. We’ve concluded from our findings that
portfolio selection during merger activities is best accomplished by allowing a third party firm to
make recommendations for the merged portfolio.
Second, prior to the acquisition, investors and finance teams should consider the true
costs of the acquisition, which include inherent costs of the merger and R&D sustainability. We
suggest that the M&A strategy team seek to fulfill a capability or product gap when engaging in
M&A activities, rather than a quest to target acquisition of a competitor in efforts to dominate
the market. Long-term growth and patient focus should be an integral part of the merger
strategy.
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Lastly, due diligence should be as granular as possible to uncover hidden product issues.
Firms should equip their staff to audit laboratory notebooks, regulatory submittals, raw data from
all development phases (Phase I, II, III and clinical) and patient complaints.
V.9 Contribution to Knowledge
We contribute to the literature on portfolio management by explaining how portfolio
decisions made during a merger could attribute to the disruption of R&D portfolios after M&A.
We also provide suggestions to help minimize these disruptions. Our research provides insight
into the actual cognition of the managers making portfolio decisions, and identify what elements
go beyond their thoughts. Our findings provide insight into what actually influences the
behaviors of the managers that make portfolio decisions, and how these behaviors motivate their
decisions. We determined what changes occur within the portfolio management process after the
merger that could possibly impact the way decisions are made during a merger. Our insights
reveal what could account for the shrinkage of a portfolio, in terms of managerial decision
making.

V.10 Limitations
A limitation of our research is that it includes managers from both the acquiring and
acquired pharmaceutical firms with varying sizes. Another limitation is that this study uses a
qualitative approach of inquiry. This study does not include a quantitative or mixed methods
approach. Sampling presents a limitation since a small sample of 13 informants was used in this
study. Lastly, this study includes pharmaceutical firms that specialize in human drug products.
Veterinarian pharmaceutical firms were excluded from this study.
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V.11 Future Research
Researchers could apply a quantitative approach to measure pre- and post-merger R&D
portfolio performance against portfolio decisions. A longitudinal study could be conducted to
look at R&D pipeline selection against performance after M&A. A quantitative research study
could be conducted to determine if M&A changes the risk-taking culture within a firm.

V.12 Conclusion
While managers apply financial-based approaches to portfolio decision making, the
interplay of manager and firm goals heavily influence their decisions during a merger. The
empirical findings from this qualitative study suggest that many influences, such as personal
goals, biases, integration complexity, risk aversion, culture, and new leadership impact how
managers make portfolio decisions. We contribute to the literature on portfolio management by
providing insight into how pharma managers make portfolio decisions in the context of a merger.
Three key findings emerged from this study. First, rigor and lack of integration in
decision-making processes influence managers’ decisions. Second, managers are unaware of the
biases that adulterate their decisions. Their perspectives on how they make decisions differ from
reality. Third, managers inject their personal criterion, along with the firms’, into portfolio
evaluations when making decisions.
Through exploration of TNT, we provide insight on how pharma managers actually make
portfolio decisions in the context of a merger. Prior to the merger, managers form an opinion of
how the merged portfolio will perform. Based on their attitude about the merger, they adjust
their risk aversion according to what leads to better job security, career growth, and financial
rewards. Through their past experiences with M&A, managers recall experiences and guide their
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portfolio decisions to align with prior favorable outcomes. Managers rely on their intuition and
gut feelings to inform their propensity to take more or fewer risks.
Most managers predicted that M&A would result in more drugs despite evidence that
R&D performance decline post-merger. Half of the firms in this study experienced a decline in
revenue post-merger. Smaller firms experienced revenue growth.
Since the economy will continue to dictate merger activity, firms should consider
adjusting their acquisition strategy to include R&D pipeline development. Firms should
implement strategies to overcome merger challenges and balance out decision-making power.
Finally, firms should consider long-term growth during portfolio selection instead of a quest to
gain short-term wins.

V.13 Engaged Scholarship Perspective
As a present day portfolio management consultant and former R&D scientist, it was
interesting to uncover the hidden influences on my decision making. Prior to this study, I was
unaware of my biases. I considered myself as an evidence-based practitioner who made
decisions based solely on facts. When I played a role in a pharmaceutical merger, I experienced
some challenges but didn’t have the knowledge or insight to attribute it to lack of integration. I
viewed challenges as growing pains. Interestingly, I believed that I’d based decisions on facts.
However, throughout this research endeavor, I’ve recalled instances where I’d certainly framed
R&D studies to align with the goals of my leader. The insight gained from this study has truly
made me a better portfolio decision-maker today.
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APPENDIX A
Exhibit A-1: Compositional Style Elements
(Mathiassen, Chiasson, and Germonprez (2012), Mathiassen (2015))
Portfolio Management
A (Area of Concern)
P (Problem Setting)

Pharmaceutical Research and Development (R&D)
Portfolio Management

F (Conceptual
Framework)
RQ (Research Question)

Theory of Narrative Thought (Decision-Making Theory)

M (Research Method)

A qualitative, multiple-case study with the R&D portfolio
managers as the unit of observation

C (Contribution)

C(Fa): Deep Dive into Post-Merger Pharmaceutical R&D
Portfolio Management to provide empirical insights into
what’s actually being done during portfolio decision
making

How do pharmaceutical R&D managers make portfolio
decisions during a merger?

C(P): Plausible Explanations for shrinkage of R&D
Portfolios
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Exhibit A-2: Antecedents of TNT
(Beach, 2010)
Theory
Image

Recognition

Scenario

Description
The basic idea of image theory is that that your store of
knowledge can be partitioned into three image categories:
value, trajectory, and image, because they are your vision
of what constitutes a valuable and properly ordered
course of events. Image theory posits two kinds of
decisions: adoption decisions and progress decisions. The
former is about adding new goals or plans to the
trajectory and strategic images; the latter is about
evaluating the progress of plan implementation toward
goals.
Assumes that the context in which a decision is to be
made provides information that allows the decision maker
to access his or her past experience and existing store of
knowledge in order to determine what to do
Describes how plausible stories can be constructed to
forecast the future and guide planning.

Explanation

Interprets and evaluates new information to integrate it
with their general knowledge about human behavior into
an evolving explanation about what happened and why.

Argument

The central idea of these theories is that the decision
maker assesses the decision situation and, drawing upon
past experience and general knowledge, formulates a
course of action that meets the demands of the situation.
The idea is that that decisions produce changes the
market, which in turn changes subsequent decision
behavior.
Incremental evaluation is reflected in the idea that plans
to address the undesirable (flawed) portions of a
forecasted future (to “repair” the forecast), with the result
that, when it arrives, the actual future usually is not all
that radically different from the forecast, improved but
still much the same. Incremental implementation is
reflected in the idea that feedback during plan
implementation allows the decision maker to take stock
and adjust what he or she is doing—sometimes changing
direction if necessary or stopping if the result is good
enough.
Influence of moral obligation and commitment on human
behavior.

Reflexivity

Incremental

Deontology

Reference
Beach 1990
Mitchell 1990

Simon 1979
Klein 1993
Klein 1996
Jungermann
1985
Thüring 1987
Pennington
and Hastie
1986,
1988,1992
Lipshitz 1993
Svenson 1992
Montgomery
1993
Soros 2008

Lindbloom
1959
Connolly 1988

Etizioni 1988,
1993
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APPENDIX B
Exhibit B-1: Interview Protocol
(Adapted from Kester et al. (2011)
Interview Protocol
1. Introduction by interviewer
An electronic recording device will be used to capture the content of this interview. This
recording will remain confidential, and will only be accessible to myself. Your responses will
be assigned a code using random numbers and letter that will only be known by the
investigators. The recordings and documentation from this interview will be kept on an
encrypted hard drive until the conclusion of this study. You should have received a copy of
my informed consent document informing you of the following: (1) your participation in this
study is strictly voluntary and that you may terminate this interview at any time, (2) content
from this interview will not be shared with other interviewees within this study, and anonymity
will be maintained for the reporting of this study, and (3) there is not intent to inflict any harm.
Your signature and transmittance of this form to me indicates that you understand the terms of
this research and your rights as a participant.
We will begin the interview shortly. You have been selected to interview as a result of your
role in the portfolio management process at ______________ pharmaceutical. Our research
study will focus on the decision making of managers during a pharmaceutical merger. I will
ask you approximately 9 questions that contain a set of sub-questions. These questions will be
divided into 3 parts. Part I will focus on the organizational aspect of portfolio management.
Part II will focus on the portfolio valuation and selection methods adopted by your firm.
Finally, part III will focus on how you personally manage portfolios (i.e. decision making,
selection, etc.). The interview will be interactive and engaging. Please feel free to answer
freely. There are no right or wrong answers. I am interested in your perspectives and insights.
The duration of this interview should span between 45-60 minutes. In the event that the
interview time is elapsed, I will ask your permission to continue or request to schedule a
follow-up interview. Thank you for your participation in this research study.
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Part I. Organizational Context and Processes
2. Role and responsibilities
2.1. What is your role within firm X?
2.2. How long have you been with the firm?
2.3. Are you from the acquired or the acquiring firm?
3. Merger Impact on Portfolio Management
3.1. What do you think led to the merger that has taken place within your organization?
3.2. What is your view of the condition in which the firm’s portfolio is in today?
3.3. What do you think will happen to the portfolio in the future?
4. Portfolio Decision Processes
4.1. Can you describe how portfolio decision-making processes within firm X work?
4.1.1. How did this process work before the merger?
4.2. How are portfolio decisions governed within your firm?
4.2.1. How were these decisions governed before the merger?
4.3. How was the portfolio selection process before the merger?
4.4. How is the portfolio selection process now?
5. Organization and Individual goals?
5.1. Have the goals of the merged firm changed?
5.1.1. If so, how?
5.2. Have your personal goals changed since the firm has merged? If so, what changed and
why?
5.3. Is the firm’s goal long or short-termed focused?
5.3.1. Has your firm’s goal changed since the merger? i.e. short vs. long
5.4. Do you feel your firm’s goals are attainable?
Part II. Portfolio Management
6. Methods
6.1. What kinds of methods are being used within firm X for making portfolio decisions?
6.1.1. Were these same methods used before the merger?
6.1.2. Do you feel these methods are effective?
7. Portfolio Selection
7.1. Can you describe a recent portfolio decision?
7.1.1. What was your role in the decision making?
7.1.2. What influenced this decision?
7.1.2.1.
Did the merger influence this decision?
7.1.2.2.
Would this decision have been different before the merger?
7.1.3. Who was involved in making the decision?
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8. Dealing with Uncertainty and Complexity
8.1. Is your firm more risk adverse post-merger as you were pre-merger?
8.2. Can you describe a situation in which you were confronted with a difficult portfolio
decision during the merger?
8.2.1. Why was this decision difficult?
8.2.2. Were you satisfied with the decision?
Part III. Individual Behaviors
9. Individual Portfolio Decisions Aspects
9.1. Do you think your past experiences influences your portfolio decisions now?
9.2. Are you rewarded for the decisions you make?
9.3. What is personally at stake when making portfolio decisions?
10. Closing Questions
10.1.
In short, do you feel the merger will result in more or fewer drugs being funded,
developed, and launched?
10.2.
Have mergers made your portfolio decision-making more challenging? If so, what
one thing would make these decisions less challenging?
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APPENDIX C
Exhibit C-1: Case Selection Criteria
Number
1
2
3

Factor
Acquired
Acquired
Horizontal
Merger

4

Industry

5

Decisionmaker

Criteria
Manager from a firm that acquired another firm.
Manager from a firm acquired by another firm.
Manager was employed during a merger that occurred
between two firms within the same sector (pharmaceutical
industry).
Manager was from one or more of the following industries:
Pharmaceutical, Biotech
Manager makes R&D portfolio decisions.
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APPENDIX D
Exhibit D-1: Quality of Case Study Research
(Adapted from Yin 2014)
Criteria

Rationale

Justification for case
research

A statement of why the case method was adopted appeared in the
research together with a clear explanation of why the case research
method is appropriate.
A statement of why case method was used.

Reasoning for using a
case research method
provided.
Unit of analysis
Theory vs.
phenomenon
Sampling strategy
Number of cases
Triangulated data
sources
Data analysis

Unit of analysis explicitly stated
Was the research grounded in existing theory or phenomenon?
How did the researcher(s) decide on which case(s) to choose?
How many cases were examined in the research?
Was there more than one source of data used to validate the research
findings?
How were the research results presented?
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APPENDIX E
Exhibit E-1: Informed Consent Document

Informed Consent
Title: Managing Pharmaceutical Research and Development Portfolios: An Empirical
Inquiry into Managerial Decision Making in the Context of a Merger
Principal Investigator: Danny Bellenger, PhD.
Student, Principal Investigator: Catrina Jones
I. Purpose & Procedure
You are invited to participate in a research study because you have been identified at a portfolio
decision-maker residing in the R&D, marketing functions or portfolio management functions.
Your participation is voluntary and information obtained from this study will be anonymous and
confidential. The purpose of this study is to explore the behaviors and actions of managers while
navigating throughout the portfolio management process. The initial interview will request
approximately 60-90 minutes of your time.
II. Procedure
If your decision is to participate in this research study, you will be asked to meet with the
researcher (and possibly a research assistant) for an information-gathering interview via phone
and face-to-face. This interview will be conducted in a private session, either in the participant’s
office or another setting suitable for private conversation free of interruption and eavesdropping.
Interview sessions will be scheduled and conducted according to the participant’s and
researcher’s mutual availability. The researcher will make every effort to give preference of
time and location to the participants’ needs when possible.
You will be asked a series of questions that you will be allowed to answer freely. Your
responses will be written in a notebook and electronically recorded. The researcher may alter the
interview questions based on your responses, but will remain within the interview protocol
established for this research study. Periodically you may be asked to repeat or clarify your
responses. The purpose of this request is to provide clarity and understanding to the researcher.
Once all of the questions have been addressed, the researcher will review her notes with you to
ensure your responses have been accurately captured.
III. Risks and Benefits
For this study, no foreseen risks have been identified other than those that could occur in
everyday life. Your participation may not benefit you personally, but we are hoping that our
findings provide insights on how mangers make R&D portfolio decisions after a pharmaceutical
merger. These insights may aid in providing gaps in the portfolio management process that
attribute to the decline of R&D productivity after a merger.
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IV. Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal
Participation in this research is voluntary. You are not required to participate in this research
study. Your decision regarding participation will not be shared with your employer. If you
decide to participate in this research study and change your decision, you have the right to
terminate your participation at any time. You may opt out of questions and exit the survey
without any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.
V. Confidentiality
Your records will be kept private to the extent allowed by law. The principal and student
investigator, as well as a research assistant, will have access to the information you provide.
Information may also be shared with those who make sure the study is done correctly (Georgia
State University Institutional Review Board and the Office for Human Research Protection). We
will use a coded study number in place of your name on study records. The information you
provide will be stored electronically on a firewall and password-protected computer. Your code
identification will be kept in a separate, password-protected file. Your name and other data that
may associate you with this study will not appear when we present this study and publish its
results. The findings will be summarized and reported in group form. You will not be identified
personally.
VI. Contact Persons:
You may contact any of the researchers conducting this study at any time.
Contact information:
Catrina Jones, cjones183@student.gsu.edu, (678) 592-1619
Dr. Danny Bellenger, dbellenger@gsu.edu, (404) 401-2424
If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a participant in this research study, you
may contact Susan Vogtner in the Office of Research Integrity at (404) 413-3513 or
svogtner@gsu.edu.
VI. Copy of Consent Form to Subject:
We will provide you a copy of this signed consent form for your records.

If you are willing to voluntarily participate in this research study, please sign below:

Participant

_________________________

Date: ____________________

If you decline to participate in this research study, no further action is requested. Thank you for
your time and consideration.
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Exhibit E-2: Contact Summary Form
Contact Summary Form
Contact Date: ________________________________________________
Contact Name:

________________________________________________

Site:

________________________________________________

Contact Phone:

________________________________________________

Written by:

________________________________________________

1. What were the main issues or themes that struck you in this contact?

2. Summarize the information you got (or failed to get) on each of the target questions you had
for this contact.
Question Category
Summary Response
Organizational contexts and processes
Portfolio selection
Dealing with uncertainty and complexity
Individual portfolio decision aspects
Organization and individual goals

3. Anything else that struck you as salient, interesting, illuminating or important in this
contact?

4. What new (or remaining) target questions do you have in considering the next contact with
this site?
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Exhibit E-3: Email Invitation
Dear [Manager]:
You are invited to participate in a research study that will explore the portfolio decision making of
managers within a pharmaceutical firm during a merger. As a manager, you are in an ideal position
to provide insights from your own experiences.
This study will involve an interview of approximately 9 questions consisting of sub-questions.
The interview is informal and will take approximately 45-60 minutes of your time. We are simply
trying to capture your experience as a portfolio decision-maker. Your responses to the questions
will be kept confidential. Each interviewee will be assigned a number code to help ensure that
personal information is not revealed during reporting.
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. If you feel uncomfortable answering any
questions, you may withdraw at any time. There is no compensation for participating in this study.
However, your participation will be a valuable addition to our research and the findings could lead
to greater understanding of portfolio management in the context of a merger.
If you are willing to participate, please suggest a day and time that best suits you and I'll do my
best to be available. If you have questions at any time about the interview and its procedures, you
may contact Catrina Jones at the email address specified below.

Thank you very much for your time.

Sincerely,
Catrina Jones
Doctoral Candidate, Georgia State University
cjones183@student.gsu.edu
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APPENDIX F
Exhibit F-1: Pre- and Post-Merger Firm Performance
Firm

Pre-Merger
Revenue

PharmaAlpha I
PharmaAlpha II
PharmaBeta
PharmaGamma
PharmaDelta
PharmaZeta
PharmaETA
PharmaTheta
PharmaIota
PharmaEpsilon

<$10B
<$10B
<$10B
>$10B
<$10B
>$10B
>$10B
>$10B
>$10B
>$10B

%Growth or Decline
in Post-Merger
Revenue (range)
<30%
>30%
>30%
> 30%
<30%
>30%
>30%
<30%
<30%
<30%

Post-Merger Firm
Performance (in terms
of overall revenue)
Growth
Growth
Growth
Growth
Growth
Decline
Decline
Decline
Decline
Decline
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